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NOTES
GETTING A FIX ON COCAINE
SENTENCING POLICY: REFORMING

THE SENTENCING SCHEME OF THE ANTI-DRUG
ABUSE ACT OF 1986
Alyssa L. Beaver*
The now-infamous "War on Drugs" campaign of the 1980s culminated
in the adoption of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which included a
provisionfor a one-hundred-to-one sentencing ratio of powder cocaine to
crack cocaine. This ratio provides that the penalty for a crime involving
five or ten grams of crack cocaine is equivalent to the sentence for a crime
involving five hundred or one thousand grams of powder cocaine. This
structure has led to a racial disparity in sentencing because African
Americans are more often charged with a crack cocaine offense than
Caucasians, who are usually indicted for powder cocaine possession.
Despite importunatepleasfrom various socialjustice groups, Congress has
not amended the statute, causing courts to grapple with addressing the
flaws of the Act. The result is a split among U.S. courts of appeals
regarding not only the meaning of the Act but also the policy behind the
penalty scheme. This Note addresses the unresolved circuit split and
courts' policy disagreements with the sentencing structure, ultimately
advocatingfor a joint legislative andjudicial solution that permits courts to
embrace a modern comprehension of the drug problem in the United States
while achieving a consistentfederal policy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODU CTION ........................................................................................
I. COCAINE IN THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE: PUBLIC CONCERN BEGETS
ATTEMPTS To REGULATE ............................................................
A. Sociologicaland Chemical History of Cocaine .....................
1. The History of Cocaine Addiction: From Incan Tribes
to H ollyw ood Icons .........................................................
2. Media Coverage of Narcotics Abuse ...............................

2533
2535
2536
2536
2539

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of
Pennsylvania. I want to thank Professor James Cohen for his guidance. Thanks to my
family, especially my mother, my best friend and role model.

2531

2532

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

3. Chemical Analysis of Cocaine ......................................... 2540
B. Ineffective PoliticalInitiativesPriorto the Anti-Drug Abuse
2542
A ct of 1986 ..............................................
1. Legislative Inertia: Congressional Hearings Yield No
2542
New Regulation ...............................................................
2. Lackluster Executive Initiatives Fail To Curb Cocaine
2 54 3
U se .................................................
C. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986........................................... 2545
1. Legislative History of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act ............. 2545
2. The Racial Disparity Promulgated by the Act's
2548
Sentencing Scheme .........................................................
D. The Sentencing Commission Weighs In .................................. 2550
E. Supreme Court Precedent Gives Additional Power to Courts
Without Resolving Ambiguity ................................................ 2552
F. CurrentMovements Toward Reform ....................................... 2554
1. Executive Opposition to the Sentencing Ratio ................ 2555
2555
2. Concern from the Bench ..................................................
2555
3. Legislators Call for Change .............................................
II. "COCAINE BASE" CIRCUIT SPLIT DEEPENS, MAGNIFYING POLICY

2557
A. Courts' DivergingResponses to the Act's Language:
Cocaine Base or Crack Cocaine?......................................... 2558
1. Only Crack Cocaine Receives Heightened Sentences ..... 2558
2558
a. Eleventh Circuit..........................................................
2559
b. Seventh Circuit...........................................................
2560
c. Ninth Circuit...............................................................
2560
d. Sixth Circuit ...............................................................
2. Cocaine Base Is Equivalent to Smokeable Forms of
256 1
C ocaine ..............................................
3. Cocaine Base Equals Crack Cocaine, Smokeable
Cocaine, and Untreated Cocaine Base ............................ 2561
2562
a. Second Circuit............................................................
2562
b. Tenth Circuit ..............................................................
2563
c. F ifth Circuit................................................................
2563
d. Third Circuit ..............................................................
2564
e. First Circuit................................................................
2564
f. Fourth Circuit.............................................................
B. Courts Institute Their Own Ratios .......................................... 2565
CONCERNS OVER SENTENCING DISPARITY ..................................

III. ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY THROUGH A LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL SOLUTION .....................................................................

A. Legislative Intent Is Unambiguous: Cocaine Base Means
Crack Cocaine ......................................................................
B. Legislative Inaction Begets Unsatisfactory Judicial
R em edies ...............................................................................

2566
2567
2569

2010]

REFORMING COCAINE SENTENCING POLICY

C. Justificationsfor the Act Do Not Warranta One-Hundredto-One Ratio ofPowder Cocaine to Crack Cocaine.............
1. Crack Cocaine Is Not More Addictive than Powder
C ocaine ............................................................................
2. Association of Violent Crime and Crack Cocaine Is
M isguided ........................................................................
3. Crack Cocaine Use Among Pregnant Women Does Not
Warrant a One-Hundred-to-One Ratio for All
O ffenders .........................................................................
4. Statistics About Crack Cocaine Use Among Youth Do
Not Suggest the Need for a Ratio ....................................
5. The Cost of Crack Cocaine Does Not Suggest a Need
for Heightened Sentences ................................................
D. The FairSentencing Act .........................................................

2533
2570
257 1
2571

257 1
2572
2572
2572

C ON CLU SION ........................................................................................... 2574
INTRODUCTION

In conjunction with the War on Drugs, launched in the early 1980s,
federal and state attorneys devoted more resources to prosecutions of illegal
drug dealers and users. 1 At that time, jurors' knowledge of drug-related
issues was minimal and the average juror could not grasp the facts of a
particular case or the applicable law; thus, it was difficult for prosecutors to
secure convictions. 2 To ameliorate the problem of uninformed jurors, the
government relied on expert witnesses to explain
the chemical properties of
3
drugs and the dangers associated with their use.
Prosecutors in Washington D.C. lionized Johnny St. Valentine Brown,
Jr., a police investigator who had emerged as the "resident narcotics expert"
of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. 4 Brown, a flamboyant
witness who brought theater to the courtroom, made the vernacular of
illegal narcotics accessible for the average juror. He translated chemical
formulas into street names of drugs, explained how drugs were used, and
detailed the manner in which drugs were sold. 5 At the outset of his
testimony, Brown declared his credentials, which purportedly included a
doctorate in pharmacology from Howard University and board certification
in pharmacology. 6 By 1983, Brown had served as an integral witness in
1. See Edward D. Sargent, FlamboyantNarcotics Expert Is Key Witness in Drug Cases,
WASH. POST, May 6, 1983, at Cl. For a discussion on the War on Drugs, see infra notes

108-17 and accompanying text.
2. See Sargent, supra note 1.
3. See id. ("The average person doesn't know the particulars of street drugs ....
[An
expert] can make or break a case."); see also infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text
(detailing the evolution of public perception of crack cocaine during the 1980s).
4. See Sargent, supra note 1.
5. See id. (noting that the District of Columbia paid Brown about $28,000 per year to
be an expert witness).
6. See id.; Bill Miller, Narcotics 'Expert' Said To Be Fraud: Witness in D.C. Criminal

Cases Is Charged with Perjury, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2000, at B8.
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over one thousand narcotics cases, testifying at as many as five trials per
7
day.
.Based on his strong reputation among D.C. prosecutors, Congress called
on Brown for advice during the drafting of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 (the Act or 1986 Act). 8 Brown testified before Congress, stating that,
based on his independent research, possession of twenty grams of crack
cocaine was just as dangerous as having one thousand grams of powder
cocaine. 9 Based in part on Brown's "expert" testimony, Congress derived a
one-hundred-to-one ratio of powder cocaine to cocaine base, which includes
crack cocaine. 10 The Act's penalty scheme instructs courts to issue a fiveyear minimum federal prison sentence to defendants convicted of crimes
involving five hundred grams of powder cocaine or five grams of crack
cocaine. 11 Similarly, a defendant convicted of possession of five thousand
grams of powder cocaine will receive the same ten-year minimum sentence
12
as a defendant with fifty grams of crack cocaine.
After Brown had testified in narcotics trials for twenty years, a defense
attorney proved that Brown had fabricated his credentials. 13 After being
indicted on eight counts of perjury, Brown pleaded guilty and was
14
sentenced to one year in prison.
Brown's now-dubious testimony about crack cocaine is representative of
the caliber of information Congress relied upon while drafting an act that
changed the landscape of drug enforcement: ambiguous and speculative.
The term "crack cocaine" entered the lexicon in 1985 and intense media
coverage of the crack cocaine epidemic ensued. 15 A flurry of high-profile
crack-cocaine-related deaths raised public concern about widespread
addiction to crack cocaine. 16 Without full comprehension of the chemical
compounds of cocaine and its derivatives or a thorough exploration of the
relative harms of cocaine and crack cocaine, Congress allowed the
17
atmosphere of panic to dictate the one-hundred-to-one ratio.
An unintended consequence of the Act's ratio is a racial disparity in
sentencing, which became apparent almost immediately after the Act took
7. See Sargent, supra note 1.
8. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws-The
Issues: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th

Cong. 166-73 (2007) (statement of Eric E. Sterling, President, Criminal Justice Policy
Foundation) [hereinafter Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws].
9. See Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws, supra note 8, at 171.

10. Crack cocaine is a subset of cocaine base, which encompasses all forms of
smokeable cocaine. See infra Part I.A.3.

11. See.21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).
12. See id.
13. See Bill Miller, Challenges PlannedAfter 'Expert' Resigns, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,

1999, at B2.
14. See Miller, supra note 6.
15. See TiM MADGE, WHITE MISCHIEF: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF COCAINE 165 (2001);
infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
16. See MADGE, supra note 15, at 165; infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the media coverage of the crack cocaine phenomenon).
17. See Hearingon Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws, supra note 8, at 171.
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effect. 1 8 African American defendants were more likely to be charged with
crack cocaine offenses, while Caucasian offenders were usually indicted for
powder cocaine possession.1 9 Thus, African American defendants were
subject to harsher sentences and sent to prison more frequently. 20 Social
justice groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union have joined the
and the American Bar Association in voicing
U.S. Sentencing Commission
21
ratio.
the
to
opposition
Despite importunate pleas from these various organizations, Congress
has taken no action to amend the statute, causing courts to grapple with
addressing the flaws of the Act. 22 The result is a split among U.S. courts of
appeals regarding not only the meaning of the Act but also the policy
behind the penalty scheme.2 3 For the purpose of sentencing, some circuits
interpret the term "cocaine base" 2 4 to refer to crack cocaine only, while
other circuits believe that "cocaine base" refers to all nonpowder forms of
Court and the legislature
cocaine. Courts have implored the U.S. Supreme
25
to take steps to resolve the split, but to no avail.
This Note addresses the unresolved circuit split and judicial disagreement
with the sentencing disparity. Part I details the history of the United States'
affair with illicit drugs, including legislative attempts to regulate cocaine
through the Act and the subsequent racial disparity wreaked by the Act's
sentencing structure. Next, Part II explores the circuit split regarding the
meaning of "cocaine base" and recent judicial attempts to remedy the
disparity caused by the Act's penalty scheme. Finally, Part III advocates
for a joint legislative and judicial solution that permits courts to advance a
modem approach to the drug problem in the United States while achieving
a consistent federal drug policy. Although the Act targets crack cocaine
more severely than any other form of cocaine base, justifications for this
one-hundred-to-one ratio are now untenable. This Note further contends
that Congress should repeal the ratio and courts should refrain from
sentencing offenders based upon policy concerns.
I. COCAINE IN THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE: PUBLIC CONCERN BEGETS
ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE

Cocaine has been part of the national drug scene for over a century, but
crack cocaine was not created until the 1980s. 26 This section discusses the
18. Vice President Joe Biden, who was an ardent supporter of the Act as a senator, has
stated that Congress did not foresee the disparity the Act caused, nor did the drafters have
any malicious intent in creating the penalty scheme. See Ellis Cose, Closing the Gap:
Obama Could Fix Cocaine Sentencing, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 2009, at 25, 25.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part I.C.2, D.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).
25. See infra Part 11.
26. See MADGE, supra note 15, at 162-65.
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history of cocaine and crack cocaine in the United States. First, it explores
the trajectory of powder cocaine from medicinal resource to illicit narcotic
and the accompanying public alarm. It then surveys the legislative and
executive responses to growing public concern about drug addiction, which
were ineffective until the passage of the 1986.Act, explored in detail in Part
I.C. Next, this part examines the U.S. Sentencing Commission's reaction to
the Act's penalty scheme and Supreme Court precedent expanding judicial
discretion in sentencing narcotics offenders. The section concludes with an
overview of current movements to change the Act's penalty scheme,
including a bill currently before Congress.
A. Sociological and ChemicalHistory of Cocaine
Legislative attempts to regulate narcotics have punctuated the last
century, all following a similar trend: laws have been swiftly enacted as an
immediate response to heightened media attention or public outcry. To
determine legislative intent with respect to the meaning of "cocaine base,"
as well as the rationale behind the one-hundred-to-one ratio set forth in the
Act, a historical survey of cocaine, including details of the intense media
coverage immediately prior to the Act, is instructive. Finally, the chemical
evolution of the drug, which has yielded a range of versions of cocaine,
demonstrates the difficulty its regulation poses to lawmakers.
1. The History of Cocaine Addiction: From Incan Tribes to
Hollywood Icons
The use of cocaine has persisted for centuries: sixteenth century Incan
tribes' use of cocaine fascinated conquistadores 27 in the same way
Americans were mesmerized by the drug's prevalence among Hollywood
stars in the 1980s. 28 Until the end of the nineteenth century, cocaine was a
prominent feature of U.S. medical journals. 29 Druggists believed that the
coca plant, the source of all forms of cocaine, could relieve ailments from
stomach pain to headaches. 30 By the beginning of the twentieth century,
however, the dangers of addiction became apparent, and a movement to
31
outlaw cocaine was born.
Hamilton Wright, a prominent physician who led the effort to achieve
federal legislation on narcotics, based his campaign on what he believed
were insidious effects of cocaine on African Americans in the South. 32 In
27. See id. at 34 (noting that once the conquistadores arrived in Peru in 1532, they
observed the Incas' cocaine use and returned to the Iberian Peninsula with a vast supply).
28. See id. at 148 (stating that "[m]any Hollywood stars admitted to taking the drug,"
adding that "[s]uited Wall Street lawyers ... were indulging in... drug-taking").
29. See id. at 107.
30. See id. at 75.
31. See id. at 88-89 (stating that by the early 1900s, many states had passed laws
banning cocaine).
32. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 43-

44 (3d ed. 1999).
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an attempt to galvanize support from Southern Democrats, Wright and other
doctors suggested that "[t]he use of 'coke' is probably much more widely
spread among negroes than among whites."'33 With the advent of Wright's
34
campaign came the first characterization of drug use along racial lines.
Proponents of federal narcotics regulation launched a far-reaching
campaign grounded in racially divisive tactics, but statistics from the time
period did not support their contentions. From 1910 to 1914, of the 2119
African Americans admitted to the Georgia State Sanitarium, 35 three were
institutionalized for narcotics addiction and only one was actually addicted
to cocaine. 36 Additionally, national surveys demonstrated that cocaine use
37
had been waning since 1912.

Despite the statistical evidence showing that the incidence of drug abuse
had diminished, in 1914, Representative Francis B. Harrison of New York
introduced a bill regulating the sale and importation of narcotics. 38 The
Harrison Act rendered the unauthorized distribution and use of cocaine
illegal but permitted companies and individuals to register as authorized
distributors. 39 Doctors were allowed to prescribe cocaine, provided it was
done "in the course of [their] professional practice only."'40 This limitation
prevented doctors from prescribing cocaine for the sole purpose of
41
maintaining patients' addictions.
Almost immediately after its enactment, opposition to the Harrison Act
was expressed in medical journals including the New York Medical Journal
and American Medicine.42 Instead of curbing illicit drug use, the New York
Medical Journal asserted, the intense regulation of cocaine led to
43
heightened violence on the black market.
Through the 1950s, the use of narcotics continued to decline
consistently.4 4 Because antinarcotic sentiment was so pervasive, however,
politicians were compelled to enact severe penalties for the sale and use of
illegal drugs. 45 Congress strengthened federal regulations, 46 applying the
death penalty to the sale of heroin to minors. 4 7
33.
34.
35.
created

See MADGE, SUpra note 15, at 89.
See id.
See id. at 90. The Georgia State Sanitarium, now called Central State Hospital, was
in 1837 as an alternative to prison for drug addicts and the mentally ill.

36.
37.
STATES
38.
39.

See id.
See James Inciardi, Introduction to HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED
1, 6 (James Inciardi ed., 1990).
Harrison Drug Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
See John C. McWilliams, The History of Drug Control Policies in the United States,

in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL INTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 29, 30-31.

40. See Harrison Drug Act § 2(a).
41. See MADGE, Supra note 15, at 107.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See MUSTO, supra note 32, at 245-46.
45. See id.
46. See id.; Arnold M. Washton, Cocaine: Drug Epidemic of the '80's, in THE COCAINE
CRISIS 33, 50 (David Allen ed., 1985).
47. See MUSTO, supra note 32, at 246.
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As the political climate shifted in the 1960s, so did public perception of
drug usage: hallucinogens such as LSD appeared and quickly swept the
nation. 48 Cocaine usage reemerged, initially among Hollywood elite; 49 by
50
the late 1960s, a "significant portion" of Americans were using drugs.
Cocaine usage spread rapidly during the 1970s, not only for its euphoric
effect but also because the drug symbolized affluence: 5 1 the price of
52
powder cocaine ranged from $75 to $100 per gram.
Developed as an alternative to the highly flammable cocaine freebase, 53
crack cocaine was first created in Los Angeles in 1981, and six crack
cocaine laboratories were uncovered that year.5 4 Three years later, dozens
of laboratories were operating nationwide. 55 By 1985, crack cocaine was
available in nearly every major city, particularly in predominantly African
American and Hispanic neighborhoods. 56 The quick expansion of crack
cocaine has been attributed to its low cost-crack cocaine ranged from $3
to $20 per vial 57-as well as to inner-city gangs, who actively distributed
58
the drug.
Between 1983 and 1985, crack cocaine usage among African American
and Hispanic populations doubled, 59 while Caucasian upper- and middleclass males between twenty-five and thirty-five years old became less
associated with the drug. 60 As crack cocaine became cheaper, the number
of cocaine-related deaths increased. 61 Donald J. McConnell, executive
director of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission, warned that cocaine
"went from the champagne drug to the beer drug."'62 As death tolls rose,
media coverage of the crack cocaine "epidemic" escalated, bringing
national attention to a new chapter in drug addiction.

48. See MADGE, supra note 15, at 142.
49. See, e.g., id. at 146-48 (noting that Woody Allen and Elton John were two
Hollywood icons known for using the drug).
50. Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After Years, It Erupted, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1986, at Al (reporting that cocaine usage had become en vogue for the first time
since the 1920s, following the introduction of heroin and marijuana).
51. See MADGE, supra note 15, at 146 ("If you could afford to take cocaine you were
making a social statement as well as a recreational choice.").
52. See EDITH FAIRMAN COOPER, THE EMERGENCE OF CRACK COCAINE ABUSE 3 (2002).

53. See infra Part I.A.3.
54. See id. at 27 & n.4 (stating that crack probably first became available in Los Angeles
in 1981 and in New York City by 1983).
55. Id. at 94.
56. See MADGE, Supra note 15, at 165.
57. See COOPER,supra note 52, at 10.
58. See id. at 29.
59. See Washton, supra note 46, at 50 (citing a survey conducted in 1985, which also
demonstrated the shift from snorting powder to smoking freebase).
60. See id.
61. See Kerr, supra note 50 (providing statistics showing that the number of "[c]ocainerelated cases in hospital emergency rooms rose from 3,300 in 1981 to nearly 10,000 in
1985").
62. Id.
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2. Media Coverage of Narcotics Abuse
Most Americans first learned about crack cocaine through media stories,
which usually disclosed tragic details of public figures' addictions.
Coverage of the dangers associated with the use of all forms of cocaine
intensified in 1979 with the emergence of the practice of smoking cocaine,
colloquially referred to as "freebasing." 63 Rolling Stone magazine focused
on smokeable forms of cocaine, calling it the "top-of-the-line model of the
Cadillac of drugs," yet cautioned that "freebasing seemed to be much more
dangerous than snorting." 64 In 1980, when comedian Richard Pryor
sustained third-degree bums after reportedly using a butane torch to light
Outlets
cocaine freebase, newspapers capitalized on the incident. 65
including The Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune, and The Boston
66
Globe ran stories about the new trend of freebasing cocaine.
In 1985, The New York Times became the first major media outlet to use
the term "crack cocaine," 67 and a follow-up article appeared on the front
page less than two weeks later, detailing crack cocaine and its intensely
addictive quality. 6 8 By 1986, major news outlets had declared crack
cocaine usage to be in "epidemic proportions. '"6 9
High-profile deaths by drug overdoses instigated a flurry of media
coverage of the issue of crack cocaine. Len Bias, a University of Maryland
basketball star, died of an apparent cocaine overdose just two days after he
was drafted to play for the Boston Celtics.70 Within weeks, a media frenzy
had erupted. 7 1 On May 18, 1986, three New York City newspapers printed
articles about rampant use of crack cocaine. 72 Television programs also
spotlighted increased drug use, including a two-hour CBS broadcast, 48
Hours on Crack Street.7 3 Media coverage undoubtedly accelerated political
efforts to combat crack cocaine and cocaine usage. Interpretation of media
reports as well as congressional debates requires an understanding of the

63. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 17. Cocaine freebase was a precursor to crack
cocaine; it was created in the late 1970s and is ingested through inhalation. See infra Part
I.A.3.
64. COOPER, supra note 52, at 17; Charles Perry, Freebase: A Treacherous Obsession,
ROLLING STONE, May 1, 1980, at 43.
65. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 18-19.
66. See Kevin B. Blackstone, Free Base: Cocaine Mixed with Ether, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 11, 1980, at 1; Hot Line Survey: Cocaine Users Believe That the Drug Is Addictive,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 1983, at B8; Medic Warns of Peril in Use of Costly 'FreeBase,'
CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1980, at 14; see also COOPER, supra note 52, at 18.
67. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 1; Jane Gross, A New, Purified Form of Cocaine
CausesAlarm As Abuse Increases,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at Al.
68. See Gross, supra note 67.
69. See id.
70. See Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1986, at D25.
71. See Kerr, supra note 50 (reporting a Newsweek editor's comment: "I felt the need to
put the drug problem in a larger context than we had in the past").

72. See id.
73. See John Corry, CBS on 'Crack Street, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1986, at C22.
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term "cocaine base," along with the chemical composition of other forms of
cocaine.
3. Chemical Analysis of Cocaine
Crack cocaine is not the only form of cocaine base, but it is the most
prevalent. 74 The complexity of the chemistry of cocaine underscores the
problems its regulation has posed to lawmakers.
Cocaine is derived from the coca plant, which, upon consumption,
anesthetizes and stimulates the central nervous system. 7 5 The coca plant
can be chewed to induce a high and is difficult to obtain in the United
States, as cocaine is usually exported from South America in powder
form. 76
The chemical name for powder cocaine is cocaine hydrochloride, which
is created through a complex process of heating and cooling coca leaves. 77
After pulverizing coca leaves into a coarse powder, alcohol is added and
78
distilled off in order to extract the most pure form of cocaine alkaloid.
Powder cocaine is ingested intranasally, through snorting, and takes effect
within five to fifteen minutes; the euphoria lasts up to two hours. 79
Cocaine freebase, first created in the 1970s, is smokeable. To create
cocaine freebase, cocaine hydrochloride must be heated and then mixed
with ammonia and ether. 80 The substance cools and yields smokeable
cocaine crystals after drying. 81 Ether, an extremely flammable substance,
renders the process of smoking cocaine freebase quite dangerous. 82 After
inhalation, cocaine reaches the brain within ten seconds, and the high lasts
83
for up to five minutes.
In the 1980s, a less dangerous form of cocaine freebase was invented:
crack cocaine. 84 When cocaine powder is mixed with baking soda to form
a paste and heated, the substance hardens into rocks. 85 This product was
given the street name "crack," for the crackling sound it makes when
smoked. 86

74. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 7-10.
75. See id. at 3.
76. See Spencer A. Stone, Note, Federal Drug Sentencing, What Was Congress
Smoking? The Uncertain Distinction Between "Cocaine " and "Cocaine Base" in the AntiDrugAbuse Act of 1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 297, 303, 307 (2007).
77. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 5; Andrew C. Mac Nally, Comment, A Functionalist
Approach to the Definition of "Cocaine Base" in § 841, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 717 (2007).
78. See MADGE, supra note 15, at 192.
79. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 4.

80. See Stone, supra note 76, at 306.
81. See id.

82. See id.
83. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 6.
84. See Stone, supra note 76, at 306-07.
85. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 6.

86. See id.
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Cocaine base may refer to many different forms of cocaine. Among
87
chemists, cocaine base refers to either crack cocaine or freebase cocaine.
Among dealers and users, cocaine base is unusable as it has yet to be
converted into the smokeable "rocks." 88 Such diverse meanings of the term
"cocaine base" further complicate the issue of legislative intent.
Table 1 is intended to elucidate the differences among the various forms
of cocaine, demonstrating the complexity of the drug and why it causes
consternation among lawmakers and jurists.
Table 1: Cocaine Forms, Creation, Ingredients, and Ingestion 89
Iocalne

Form
Crack
Vocaine

Coca
LePaves

Powder
Cnelkne

Cocaine
Frephase

Chemical
Ingredients

coca
leaves

cocaine
hydrochloride,
and sugar
(in street forms)

cocaine
hydrochloride,
anmnonia, and
ether

cocaine
hydrochloride,
baking soda
or sodium
hydroxide,
and alkaline

Ingestion

Orally

Inanay

Smoking

Smoking

Cocaine Base
cocaine hydrochloride, with
ammonia, ether or
am o a
baoig soda

Among ues
Method

(ie., "Snorting")

none
Chemi

Smoking

Time To

Tneo
Enter
Bloodstream

How the
Form Is
Made

Among ses
30
5-15 minutes

30 seconds

30 seconds

Chmil.
30 seconds

minutes

Natural

none

Extract cocaine
alkaloid from

Heat cocaine
hydrochloride

Mix cocaine
powder with

Among users:
Mix powder cocaine
with ether and ammonia

coca plant;

and mix with

baking soda

or baking soda but do not

add sugar to
decrease purity
and increase
weight

ammonia and
ether

and heat until
"rocks"
harden

heat; which would render
it incomplete and
unusable
Chernicall:
Mix cocaine with any

ether, including baking
soda, and/or ammonia,
cool into hardened,
smokeable substance

87. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 6; Mac Nally, supra note 77, at 717.
88. See Mac Nally, supra note 77, at 717.
89. See infra Part I.C. 1. In interpreting the terms of the Act, district and circuit courts
have attempted to analyze the drug's chemical properties, a difficult task that has contributed
to the circuit split. See infra Part II.A. For more information on the chemical composition of
cocaine, see COOPER, supra note 52; MADGE, supra note 15; Mac Nally, supra note 77;
Stone, supra note 76.
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B. Ineffective PoliticalInitiatives Priorto the Anti-DrugAbuse
Act of 1986
In the 1980s, public awareness of the problems related to cocaine
addiction made narcotics regulation a popular political issue, pursued by the
Democrat-controlled Congress. 90 This section discusses failed attempts by
both the executive and legislative branches to curb the growing use of
cocaine prior to 1986. Congressional hearings produced recommendations
from various drug researchers, yet legislators took no significant action.
Similarly, President Ronald Reagan commissioned various task forces to
intercept drugs during their importation to the United States, but these
efforts failed to decrease drug trafficking. Reagan also launched the
unsuccessful "Just Say No" campaign but made no attempts to change the
law enforcement of drug dealing.
1. Legislative Inertia: Congressional Hearings Yield No New Regulation
Heightened awareness of drug addiction among Americans compelled
Congress to begin investigations, yet it took -no significant action. 9 1 The
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a series of
92
hearings in 1979 to learn about the health risks posed by drug addiction.
Though these hearings were intended to address general drug abuse, most
93
witnesses focused on the emerging trend of smokeable cocaine.
Researchers for the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), Dr. Robert
C. Petersen and Dr. Robert Byck, portended the drug problems of the
coming decade, asserting that smoking cocaine was far more dangerous
than snorting it because psychological dependency developed almost
immediately. 94 While both researchers acknowledged that the smoking
phenomenon was not widespread, they warned that it could become a major
95
threat to public health.
At the conclusion of their testimony in 1979, Byck and Petersen
conveyed three recommendations to the House Select Committee, which
they believed would prevent the onset of a crack cocaine epidemic. 9 6 The
researchers (1) requested funding for additional research on the drug, (2)
urged that the government collaborate with the media on a campaign to
educate the public on the hazards of smoking cocaine, and (3) suggested

90. See Mac Nally, supra note 77, at 755-69.
91. See MUSTO, supra note 32, at 265 (discussing the parents' movement against
increased tolerance of drugs, which gained traction after research found that the most
popular parties among teenagers were "drug parties").
92. See Cocaine: A Major Drug Issue of the Seventies: Hearing Before the H Select
Comm. on NarcoticsAbuse and Control, 96th Cong. 16 (1979).
93. See id. (statements of Dr. Robert Byck and Dr. Robert C. Petersen, Researchers,
National Institute on Drug Abuse).
94. See id. at 63 (statement of Dr. Robert Byck, Researcher, National Institute on Drug
Abuse).
95. See id. at 62-68.
96. See id. at 136-42.
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collaborate on an
that U.S. scientists and South American scientists
97
investigation into the causes of drug addiction.
While Congress never specifically addressed the three recommendations
from NIDA, the 1980 federal budget reflected minor increases in
appropriations to the Division of Community Assistance for drug abuse
prevention efforts. 98 The Select Committee also passed legislation during
the early 1980s creating "National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention
Week" and "Just Say No to Drugs Week." 99 These efforts were widely
criticized as inadequate and ultimately failed to achieve a reduction in drug
abuse. 100

From the inception of the War on Drugs, congressional policy was to
increase funding to law enforcement agencies and allocate less to research
and treatment. 10 1 Much of the appropriations to law enforcement were
10 2
earmarked for task forces to intercept drugs before entering the country;
by 1984, over one dozen task forces operated in states known for having
high volumes of drug trafficking. 10 3 Despite these efforts during the early
Just as
1980s, however, drug use only continued to increase. 10 4
congressional hearings did not spur any meaningful regulation, presidential
administrations were similarly engaged in futile attempts to combat the
drug problem during the 1970s and 1980s.
2. Lackluster Executive Initiatives Fail To Curb Cocaine Use
By the 1970s, public attention to cocaine abuse forced presidential
candidates to address the issue during their campaign speeches. At the
beginning of his second term in 1973, Richard Nixon boasted that
Americans had "turned the corner on drug addiction in the United
States." 10 5 President Jimmy Carter's 1976 platform included a promise to
decriminalize marijuana, 10 6 yet in an open letter to Congress in 1977, he
indicated that law enforcement and research with respect to other drugs
should be enhanced. 10 7 Neither Nixon nor Carter crafted a consistent

97. See id.
98. See William J. Bukoski, The FederalApproach to Primary Drug Abuse Prevention
and Education, in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at
93, 104.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See COOPER, supra note 52, at 60-61.
See Kerr, supra note 50.
See MUSTO, supra note 32, at 267.
See MADGE, supra note 15, at 164-65.
See id.

104. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 61.

105. See Remarks at the First National Treatments Alternatives to Street Crime
Conference, 1 PuB. PAPERS 788 (Sept. 11, 1983).
106. See NPR, Timeline: America's War on Drugs, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=9252490 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
107. See Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse, 2 PUB.PAPERS 1400 (Aug. 2, 1977)
("We can no longer concern ourselves merely with keeping illicit drugs out of the United
States, but we must join with other nations to deal with this global problem by combating
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federal anti-drug policy, and while the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980
heralded the War on Drugs, 10 8 Reagan's substantive initiatives for drug
109
abuse prevention did not begin in earnest until well into his second term.
A myriad of high-profile but ultimately unsuccessful campaigns against
drug abuse defined President Reagan's strategy to combat the drug
epidemic. Reagan officially launched the "War on Drugs" on June 24,
1982, with the creation of the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy. 110
First Lady Nancy Reagan joined the movement, announcing the "Just Say
No" campaign in 1982.111 Another campaign entitled "Cocaine: The Big
Lie" targeted individuals eighteen to thirty-five years old and sought to
explain the dangers of cocaine abuse. 112 By the end of Reagan's first term,
113
however, drug abuse had not declined in any appreciable sense.
During his reelection campaign, Reagan promised a shift in focus of his
War on Drugs, from law enforcement efforts to education and treatment,
specifically addressing crack cocaine. 114 In 1986, thirteen public service
announcements about crack cocaine use were aired in seventy-five
markets. 115 Reagan and his wife delivered a national public address on
drug abuse, identifying crack cocaine as the most imminent threat. 116 This
series of public addresses was widely regarded as ineffective in deterring
117
drug abuse.
By the mid-1980s, the problem of drug addiction had gained national
attention and the media warned of a crack cocaine epidemic. In 1986,
public concern finally reached new levels, compelling Congress and the
President to take a significant step toward curbing drug addiction. In just
over a month, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was drafted, debated, and
passed.

drug traffickers and sharing our knowledge and resources to help treat addiction wherever it
occurs.").
108. See MUSTO, supra note 32, at 266-67.
109. See Joel Brinkley, Some Flaws in the PresidentialRivals' Drug Plans,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1984, at A24 (suggesting that while President Ronald Reagan employed strong
rhetoric on fighting drugs, his "strategy include[d] few new initiatives" aimed at preventing
and reducing drug abuse).
110. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 65.
111. See id; Philip H. Dougherty, Drug Drive Outlined to FirstLady, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1983, at D22.
112. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 66.

113. See Brinkley, supra note 109 ("In fact, the Government's official estimate is that use
of the three major illicit drugs, heroin, cocaine and marijuana, has increased.").
114. See Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Law: Words, Deeds, Political Expediency, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A18; Kerr, supra note 50.
115. See COOPER, supra note 52, at 66.

116. See Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1179 (Sept. 14, 1986) ("[A] new epidemic: smokeable cocaine, otherwise known as crack.
It is an explosively destructive and often lethal substance which is crushing its users.").
117. See Brinkley, supra note 114; Kerr, supra note 50.
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C. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986118
In addition to mandating penalties for offenders convicted of cocaine
possession, the Act also appropriated funds for educational and preventative
efforts. 119 The term "crack cocaine" does not appear in the Act's penalty
scheme; rather, the Act imposes a one-hundred-to-one ratio of powder
cocaine to cocaine base. 12 0 Because crack cocaine is a form of cocaine
base, it is unclear whether the heightened sentences should be meted out for
only crack cocaine or for all crimes involving a form of cocaine base-the
brevity of the floor debates yield a paucity of indicia as to the drafters'
intent. After the bill's enactment, a racial disparity emerged among
offenders sentenced under the statute because African American offenders
have traditionally been associated with crack cocaine and Caucasian
offenders with other forms. This section discusses the legislative history of
the Act, its provisions for sentencing crimes involving cocaine, as well as
the racial disparity that emerged as a result of the sentencing structure.
1. Legislative History of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
The bipartisan response to increased media attention to crack cocaine
made floor discussion about the Act's provisions almost entirely
amicable. 12 1 The first federal legislation to address drug abuse since 1970,
22
the Act was adopted just two weeks before the November 1986 elections.1
In drafting the 192-page bill, senators and representatives instituted
draconian penalties for all drug offenses and appropriate funds for law
23
enforcement. 1
During early discussions about the bill, senators used media reports to
buttress their claims about the dangers associated with crack cocaine.
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania cited a "cover story in the June 16,
1986 issue of Newsweek . . . [noting that] the crack trade is similar to a

118. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
119. Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Signs Anti-Drug Measure; Hopes for 'Drug-Free
Generation,'N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1986, at B19.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2006) (defining the sentence for "500 grams or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of... cocaine" and "5 grams or
more of a mixture or substance ... which contains cocaine base" as a minimum of five
years).
121. While Democrat Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., then-Speaker of the House, was the
first to hold a meeting among the House Committees, Minority Leader Robert H. Michel
brought the Republicans in quickly, out of concern that the drug issue would be co-opted by
the Democrats for the next election. See Kerr, supra note 50.
122. See DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA 306-07 (Steven R. Belenko ed., 2000);
Kerr, supra note 50; see also STEVEN B. KARCH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COCAINE 144 (2d ed.

2006).
123. DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 122, at 306-07 (noting that the

Act "established increased prison sentences for drug sale and possession, eliminated
probation or parole for certain drug offenders, increased fines, and allowed for forfeiture of
assets and that "[m]ost federal funding authorized under the 1986 act went to law
enforcement").
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'guerrilla insurgency,' which makes an 'infuriatingly elusive target for
24
police."1
Upon introducing the bill in the House of Representatives,
Representative Mario Biaggi of New York noted that the dangers of crack
cocaine compelled swift congressional action. 125 The Senate's version was
in draft form by September 26, 1986.126 Democrat Lawton Chiles of
Florida was the first senator to address the penalty scheme, 127 joined by his
colleagues who specifically referred to the need for stringent penalties for
1 28
crack cocaine.
Congress proffered five justifications for the one-hundred-to-one ratio:
(1) the addictive quality of crack cocaine, (2) that crack cocaine was
associated with violent crime, (3) that the use of crack cocaine among
pregnant women posed threats to children in utero, (4) that more young
people were using crack cocaine, and (5) that the low cost of crack cocaine
made it especially prevalent and more likely to be consumed in large
quantities. 129
In arguing that immediate passage of the bill was imperative, senators
and representatives underscored the epidemic of crack cocaine use among
youth, as well as the drug's intense addictive quality. Senator Edward M.
Kennedy of Massachusetts noted that almost two-thirds of high school
seniors had tried an illicit drug and almost twenty-six percent of high school
seniors had used cocaine. 130 Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont reported
that crack cocaine was "sweeping the Nation" because of its availability and
13 1
addictive quality.
Members of Congress indicated an extreme fear of crack cocaine and its
implications on youth and inner cities. Representative James Traficant
asserted that "[c]rack is reported by many medical experts to be the most
addictive narcotic drug known to man." 1 32 Traficant added, "I am relieved
that provisions I coauthored in H.R. 5394...

penalties for dealing crack."' 133

[will] create new stiff

124. 132 CONG. REc. 17,919 (1986) (statement of Sen. Specter).
125. See id. at 22,709 (statement of Rep. Biaggi) ("Mr. Chairman, finally, the straw that
broke the camel's back. Crack.").
126. See id. at 26,429 (meeting minutes).
127. See id. at 26,435 (statement of Sen. Chiles).
128. See id. ("This bill deals basically with the gamut of the problems that most of us
have been so terribly concerned with .... We have enhanced the penalties for drugs, but
especially for crack cocaine."). Senator Lawton Chiles further stated that the bill "will help
our law enforcement officials by strengthening criminal penalties for drugs like crack
cocaine. This is an absolutely essential first step. Current law makes it very difficult to
arrest and convict crack dealers and traffickers." See id.
129. See DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCuRDY, ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM:
TwENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 2 (2006), available at

http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf.
130. See 132 CONG. REC. 27,173 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
131. See id. at 27,187 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("One hit costs just $10.
addiction can begin after only the second use of crack.").
132. Id. at 22,667 (statement of Rep. Traficant).
133. Id.

Users say

20101

REFORMING COCAINE SENTENCING POLICY

2547

Debates in the House of Representatives and Senate equated nonpowder
forms of cocaine with crack cocaine. 134 Legislators explicitly recognized
that they sought to treat cocaine powder differently from crack cocaine,
believing that a penalty scheme that punishes crack cocaine harshly was the
best way to curb the crack cocaine epidemic. 135 Lawton Chiles, Senator
from Florida, a major drug hub, was an ardent supporter of the bill and
lauded it for recognizing "crack as a distinct and separate drug from cocaine
hydrochloride with specified amounts of five grams and fifty grams for
1 36
enhanced penalties."
A handful of senators opposed the Act on the grounds that measures
taken against crack cocaine were too extreme. Senator Daniel Evans of
Washington stated that because drug use peaked in the late 1970s, "there is
no compelling evidence that the overall problem is significantly worse now
than it has been for the last decade."' 37 Citing a study by the Federal Drug
Administration, Evans noted that "crack . . . is not the drug of choice for
most users."' 38
Evans suggested that unbalanced media attention
exaggerated the insidiousness of crack cocaine.1 39
Senator Chiles
challenged the accuracy of Evans's statements, observing that the studies
were conducted in 1980 and 1984 and thus did not reflect the explosion of
crack cocaine usage, which happened in 1985.140
Throughout the drafting process, senators and representatives were
acutely aware of the scrutiny from the media.141 Press reports at the time of
the Act's passage criticized both the Senate and the House for hastily
putting together the Act. 142 Drafters were confident that the Act would be
vindicated in practice, as it set forth a systematic scheme to stop drug use,
43
through interdiction, treatment, and prevention.'
134. See id. at 32,762 (meeting minutes) ("cocaine free base (known as 'crack')").
135. See id. at 22,667 (statement of Rep. Traficant) (noting that the bill imposes stringent
penalties and appropriates "additional funds [to] our law enforcement officers in the fieldat the local, State, and Federal levels").
136. See id. at 27,180 (statement of Sen. Chiles). Cocaine hydrochloride is the chemical
name for powder cocaine, while the term cocaine base refers to a number of different
chemical compounds. See supra Part I.A.3.
137. See id. at 26,441 (statement of Sen. Evans).
138. See id.
139. See id.

140. See id. (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("I think we need to review those [studies] and
make sure how current they are because I think those are reflecting what they thought were
trends or statistics that are 3 and 4 years old and that are not current.").
141. See id. at 26,437 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("The press look[s] down at us and say,
'Wait a minute. There they go again, another war on drugs.').
142. See David Hoffman, A Flawed Legacy: The Reagan Era Is Winding Down, and the
Time Bombs-Budget Deficits and Arms Proliferation-AreTicking, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
1986, at W19; see, e.g., Bobby Bearak & Richard Meyer, Extent of Use Argued; Drug
Furor: Overdue or Much Ado?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at Al; Anthony Lewis, Abroad
at Home: The PoliticalNarcotic,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1986, at A15.
143. See 132 CONG. REc. 26,464 (statement of Sen. Abdnor) ("[T]his bipartisan
legislation calls for a 3-pronged attack in our war on drugs. I wish to commend our majority
leader and our colleagues from both sides of the aisle who have led the effort to bring this
legislation before the Senate.").
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To address interdiction, the Act provides that the sentence for a defendant
found guilty of possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or
more of powder cocaine is a minimum of five years in prison. 144
Individuals convicted of possession with intent to distribute only five grams
of cocaine base, however, are also subject to a minimum of five years in
prison.145 The same ratio was instituted for the amount needed to trigger a
ten-year prison sentence:
five thousand grams of powder cocaine or fifty
46
grams of cocaine base. 1
With respect to treatment, Congress allocated $675 million for recovery
programs 147 and earmarked $125 million for state drug and alcohol
14 8
programs, which were distributed on the basis of population and need.
Toward prevention, Congress allocated $80 million for state and local
educational agencies to combat drug use. 149 NIDA received $27 million to
expand its drug research program: it created primary prevention projects
for the purpose of understanding the progression of drug dependence and
the criteria for identifying adolescents at high risk for drug abuse. 150 In
addition, $1.1 billion was granted to law enforcement
agencies,151 of which
152
local police agencies received $230 million.
The appropriations and earmarks that accompanied the Act are more
easily deciphered than the penalty scheme. While the funding has long
since been exhausted, however, the one-hundred-to-one ratio is still in
place. 153 As a result, racial disparities continue to plague the nation's
prison populations.
2. The Racial Disparity Promulgated by the Act's Sentencing Scheme
Because possessing five grams of cocaine base triggers the same fiveyear sentence as five hundred grams of powder cocaine, 154 the result is a
one-hundred-to-one ratio of powder cocaine to cocaine base in
sentencing. 15 5 In practice, even low-level crack cocaine offenders are
punished severely: the average sentence for an individual found guilty of
possessing twenty-five grams of powder cocaine is fourteen months, while

144. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006).
145. See id.
146. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A).

147. See 132 CONG. REc. 26,460 (statement of Sen. Broyhill).
148. See id. at 26,451-52 (statement of Sen. Abdnor).
149. See id. at 26,452 ("Thus, education for prevention is a key element in our war on
drugs. It offers the most effective, yet least expensive, means for fighting substance
abuse.").
150. See HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 110.

151. See Brinkley, supra note 114.
152. See id.
153. See HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 109;

Cose, supra note 18.
154. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006).
155. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING 7 (2009),

available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp-crack-sentencing.pdf.
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a defendant found guilty of possessing less than twenty-five grams of crack
156
cocaine is subject to an average of sixty-five months.
The one-hundred-to-one ratio adversely affects African Americans
because crack cocaine is disproportionately consumed by African
Americans as compared to Caucasians, 157 and the low cost of crack cocaine
makes crack cocaine much more prevalent in inner cities. 158 In 1995,
almost a decade after the Act was adopted, the Los Angeles Times reported
that no Caucasian defendant had been charged with crack cocaine offenses
in federal courts in Los Angeles, Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas,
or in seventeen state courts. 159 In 2000, less than six percent of crack
cocaine offenders were Caucasian, and more than eighty percent were
African American. 160 By 2006, for every ten African Americans tried for
crack cocaine possession, 1one white defendant was charged with a crime
16
involving crack cocaine.
The racial disparity is further magnified because African American drug
offenders have a greater chance of being sentenced to prison than Caucasian
162
drug offenders, given the average quantities involved in a drug offense.
The median amount of crack cocaine a defendant is charged with is fiftytwo grams, which triggers the statutory ten-year sentence. 163 Conversely,
the median amount of powder cocaine is 340 grams, which is insufficient to
164
warrant a prison sentence.
Several civil rights groups have criticized the Act for perpetuating racial
discrimination in the criminal justice system. 165 The American Civil
Liberties Union has urged Congress to eliminate the one-hundred-to-one
ratio and enhance sentences for "high-level traffickers of both crack and
powder cocaine."1 66 Families Against Mandatory Minimums and The
Sentencing Project have joined the campaign to repeal the one-hundred-toone ratio. 167 The American Bar Association has also observed that the ratio
156. See id. at 2-3.
157. See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 3.
158. See id. at 1.
159. See Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities over Whites, L.A. TIMES, May

21, 1995, at Al, A26.

160. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 63 tbl.3 (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/
2002crackrpt.htm [hereinafter 2002 REPORT].
161. See Hearingon Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws, supra note 8, at 170.
162. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 155, at 3-5.

163. See id. at 3.
164. See id.

165. See, e.g., Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 4.
166. See id. at 7 ("[T]here is no rational medical or penological reason for the 100:1
disparity between crack and powder cocaine, and instead it causes an unjustified racial
disparity in our penal system.").
167. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 155, at 8; Press Release, Families Against
Mandatory Minimums, 22 Years or Less than Half (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.famm.org/

Newsandlnformation/PressReleases/22yearsorlessthanhalf.aspx ("Not only is the crack
penalty unwarranted and insupportable,. . . it punishes small time users and dealers the same
or worse than international drug kingpins. Moreover, it does so in a way that is
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set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act is "plainly unjust," advocating that the
gap be closed. 168 The high-profile U.S. Sentencing Commission echoes the
concerns set forth by these social justice groups, urging Congress to take
action to remedy the disparity.
D. The Sentencing Commission Weighs In
From the early 1990s, the Sentencing Commission has denounced the
Act's ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine. Its members have
attempted to use the Commission's special position as a congressional
advisor to effect change.
Established in 1984 by the Sentencing Reform Act, the Sentencing
Commission is an independent agency of the judicial branch. 169 The
Commission's objectives include guiding federal courts in issuing
sentences, advising Congress and the President in creating an effective
crime policy, and compiling surveys on a broad range of sentencing
trends.' 70 As such, the Sentencing Commission's duties extend beyond
issuing Sentencing Guidelines for federal courts and include evaluating the
effectiveness of various sentencing structures. 171
During public
meetings, 172 the Commission's seven members not only promulgate
sentencing recommendations but also consider federal sentencing statistics,
173
compiled in annual reports issued by the Commission to Congress.
The Sentencing Commission has devoted a significant portion of many of
its annual reports to imploring Congress to change its approach to cocaine
and crack cocaine policy. In addition to defining cocaine base as "crack" in
a 1993 report to Congress, 174 the Sentencing Commission has sent
numerous reports to Congress detailing its opposition to the ratio. Having
consistently maintained that Congress should eliminate the penalty scheme
discriminatory."). The National District Attorneys Association has recognized that the onehundred-to-one ratio may be excessively stratified but does not support a reduction to a oneto-one ratio. See Rhonda McMillion, Room on the Front Burner: Congress Gives Prime

Spot on Its Agenda to Key Criminal Justice Issues, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 67 ("The
disparity 'has resulted in penalties that sweep too broadly[,J ... overstate the seriousness of
offenses, and produce a large racial disparity in sentencing."').
168. See id.
169. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991998 (2006)).
170. See AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2009),
availableat http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCOverview_200906.pdf.
171. See Daniel M. Levy, Note, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack
of Control over the FederalSentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623,

2631 (2009).
172. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/RULES 11-0l .pdf.
173. See AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 170,
at 1.
174. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, at 144 (2007) ("'Cocaine base,'
for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is the street name for a form of
cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate,
and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form.").
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advanced in the Act, the Commission has described the problem
of
75
disparate sentencing created by the Act as "urgent and compelling."'
Despite disagreement with the ratio, the Sentencing Guidelines set forth
by the Commission mirrored those included in the Act until 2007. As early
as 1995, however, the Sentencing Commission called attention to the
unfairness in crack cocaine sentencing, reaching the conclusion that the
one-hundred-to-one ratio was unjustified and caused an unnecessary
disparity in prison terms. 176 In a special report to Congress, the
Commission recommended that the penalties for powder cocaine and crack
cocaine be equalized and that sentencing enhancements should be triggered
when violence or other harms occur in connection with dealing either
powder cocaine or crack cocaine. 177 Congress explicitly rejected these
recommendations, signifying the first time Congress ever rejected an
178
amendment suggested by the Sentencing Commission.
In 2002, the Sentencing Commission once again informed Congress that
the sentences for crack cocaine are unjustified and called for the Act to be
amended. 179 Congress's determination that crack cocaine was more
harmful than powder cocaine and therefore required a harsher sentence was
called into question. 180 The Commission found that the ratio was created
based upon a misperception of the dangers of crack cocaine, which had
since been proven to have a less drastic effect than previously thought. 181
The Commission contended that quantity ratios should not be the basis
for penalties; rather, sentencing schemes should focus on punishing highlevel cocaine traffickers.182 It perceived that Congress was in favor of
maintaining some sort of ratio, however, so the Commission attempted to
strike a compromise, recommending a decrease in the ratio from onehundred-to-one to twenty-to-one. Under this new ratio, the amount of crack
cocaine needed to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum would be 25
grams, and 250 grams would warrant the ten-year minimum. Congress
83
again rejected this proposal.1
175. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes
To Amend Guidelines for Terrorism, Sex Offenses, Intellectual Property Offenses, and
Crack Cocaine Offenses (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0407.htm.
176. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 160, at 12.
177. See id.
178. See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 6 (noting that Congress found that "the
sentence imposed for trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine should generally exceed the
sentence imposed for trafficking in a like quantity of powder cocaine").
179. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 160, at 91 ("[T]he Commission firmly and
unanimously believes that the current federal cocaine sentencing policy is unjustified.").
180. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 8 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf (noting that the 1986 Act was based on information about "the
relative harmfulness of the two drugs and the relative prevalence of certain harmful conduct
associated with their use and distribution that more recent research and data no longer

support").
181. See id.

182. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 160, at viii-ix.
183. See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 6.
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In the absence of congressional action by 2007, the Sentencing
Commission amended its own Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine
offenders, lowering the recommended sentence for most crack cocaine
offenses.1 84 Sentencing ranges for first-time offenses involving five grams
or more of crack cocaine were lowered from 62 to 78 months, to 51 to 63
months; first-time offenses involving fifty grams or more of crack cocaine
were subject to 97 to 121 months, lowered from 121 to 151 months, before
accounting for other relevant factors under the Guidelines.1 85 In ratifying
this amendment, the Commission intended to provide "relief to crack
cocaine offenders impacted by the disparity created by federal cocaine
sentencing policy." 186 Although these ranges became advisory in 2005,187
judges tend to follow the Guidelines when issuing sentences.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Commission, modifying its power so that it conforms to Sixth
Amendment requirements. 188
As a result, while the Sentencing
Commission has implored Congress to take action, courts have been
afforded more discretion in sentencing. A prominent circuit split has
developed regarding the meaning of "cocaine base" for the purpose of the
Act, and intense public debate over the policy behind the crack cocaine
sentencing ratio has also emerged. Despite opportunities, the Supreme
Court has not provided a resolution to these issues but rather has granted
expanded discretion to lower courts, perpetuating inconsistent narcotics
sentencing policy.
E. Supreme Court Precedent Gives AdditionalPower to Courts Without
Resolving Ambiguity
The Supreme Court has not explicitly acknowledged that the onehundred-to-one ratio contributes to a racial disparity in sentencing, nor has
the Court resolved the circuit split regarding the meaning of "cocaine base."
Instead, the Supreme Court has left circuit courts to address the perceived
unfairness inherent in the one-hundred-to-one ratio. Through a series of
cases, the Court has given flexibility to sentencing courts, allowing them to
consider the racial implications of the one-hundred-to-one ratio.
The Court considered the one-hundred-to-one ratio set forth in the Act in
Kimbrough v. United States.18 9 Kimbrough faced a statutory minimum
sentence of fifteen years after pleading guilty to possession with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, among other charges. 190

184. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, at 140 (2007).
185. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 175; see also Levy, supra
note 171, at 2631-32 (describing the other factors taken into account by sentencing courts,
including the circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant).
186. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 175.
187. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
188. See infra Part I.E.
189. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
190. See id.
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Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 191 which had not yet rejected the
one-hundred-to-one ratio, Kimbrough was subject to a minimum of
nineteen years. 192 At sentencing, the lower court chose to disregard the
Sentencing Guidelines based on its opposition to the one-hundred-to-one
ratio and the racial disparity it promulgates.1 93 In departing from the
Guidelines, the court cited United States v. Booker,194 asserting that the
Supreme Court permitted courts to disregard sentencing ranges based upon
policy disagreements.1 95 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
vacated the sentence and held that any prison term "outside the guidelines
ranges is per se unreasonable when it is based" solely on policy
disagreements, such as "the sentencing disparity for crack and powder
196
cocaine offenses."'
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit. 19 7 In doing so, it
resolved a circuit split as to whether courts may take the disparity
promulgated by the one-hundred-to-one ratio into account when meting out
sentences. 198 The Court held that a sentencing judge must assess the
Guidelines in its consideration of a sentence, but may choose to disregard
the Guidelines based upon an ideological disagreement with the crack
cocaine and powder cocaine disparity. 199 An appellate court is not entitled
to disturb the lower court's sentence unless it is unreasonable; the Court
found policy concerns to be reasonable grounds to disregard Sentencing
2 00
Guidelines.
In its decision, the Kimbrough Court undertook an extensive historical
analysis of the 1986 Act and surveyed the Sentencing Commission's
continual objections. The Court accepted that crack cocaine and powder
cocaine are "chemically similar," sympathizing with the many attempts by
191. See supra Part I.D.
192. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 86.
193. See id. at 93 (criticizing the "disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine
guidelines have in sentencing").
194. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
195. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90.
196. See United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
197. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S.at 111-12.
198. At the time Kimbrough v.United States was decided, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the D.C. and Third Circuits maintained that a district court may take the sentencing disparity
into account when imposing a sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 1347
(D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits held that
a sentencing court may not stray from Sentencing Guidelines based on its disapproval of the
disparity. See, e.g., United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Johnson, 474 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir.
2006); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller,
450 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006). The circuit split identified by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kimbrough does not bear any relation to the circuit split regarding the meaning of
"cocaine base."
199. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
200. See id. at 111.
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the Sentencing Commission to induce Congress to repeal the one-hundredto-one ratio.20 1 In addition, the Court suggested that Congress was not well
versed in the dangers of crack cocaine at the time. the Act was signed
because crack cocaine was a "relatively
new drug" that had quickly become
"a matter of great public concern. 20 2
In Spears v. United States,20 3 the Supreme Court considered whether
sentencing courts may adopt their own ratios of cocaine base to powder
cocaine. 20 4 In Spears, the lower court articulated its own twenty-to-one
ratio of cocaine to cocaine base on the grounds that the one-hundred-to-one
ratio had no penological justification. In a per curiam decision relying
almost solely on Kimbrough, the Court held that sentencing courts are
permitted to institute their own ratios. 20 5 The Court found that Kimbrough
expanded the discretion of courts to disregard the Sentencing Guidelines, a
necessary byproduct of which includes the imposition of a court-determined
206
ratio.
With each Supreme Court term that concludes without providing a
workable solution for crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing, the
injustice of the circuit split persists: the sentence for the same crime can be
dramatically different depending upon where the crime occurred. 20 7 The
Obama Administration has recognized the disproportionate effect the ratio
has on African American defendants, inciting renewed efforts to change the
ratio and counteract the racial disparity caused by the sentencing structure.
F. CurrentMovements Toward Reform
Over the last year, the Obama Administration, legislators, and judges
have all voiced opposition to the current one-hundred-to-one ratio and the
resulting racial disparity, initiating a groundswell of support to eradicate the
ratio. While all three branches agree that the ratio is unfounded, a solution
has been elusive.

201. See id. at 94.
202. See id. at 95.
203. 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam).
204. See id. at 842.
205. See id. at 843 ("A sentencing judge who is given the power to reject the disparity
created by the crack-to-powder ratio must also possess the power to apply a different ratio
which, in his judgment, corrects the disparity.").
206. See id. (holding that Kimbrough recognized "district courts' authority to vary from
the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them").
207. Defendants have also unsuccessfully challenged their convictions and sentences on
the grounds that the Act's punishment scheme violates Equal Protection principles. In
United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992), the defendant argued that the Act
was unconstitutional because African Americans are more likely than Caucasians to be in
possession of crack cocaine. The Court held the statute constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, noting that the legislation was not passed for a racially discriminatory
purpose. See id. at 1559. Every federal court that has heard a disparate impact or equal
protection claim against the Act has also upheld the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Butler,
41 F.3d 1435, 1442 (1 1th Cir. 1995); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 739-41 (1st
Cir. 1994); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992).
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1. Executive Opposition to the Sentencing Ratio
Key figures in the Obama Administration are especially outspoken in
advocating for amendments to federal cocaine laws. Attorney General Eric
Holder recently commented on the racial implications of the sentencing
20 8
disparity, urging that the sentencing gap be closed.
Drug czar Gil Kerlikowske, an Obama appointee, has stated that most
elements of the "War on Drugs" are relics that should be replaced with
rational alternatives, including eradication of the one-hundred-to-one
ratio. 20 9 Vice President Joe Biden, who was an enthusiastic supporter of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act as a senator, now calls the sentencing ratio a mistake.
While Biden maintains that the bill was created with good intentions, its
unacceptable effects include racial stratification in sentencing and
2 10
unnecessarily severe penalties for low-level drug dealers.
2. Concern from the Bench
Members of the judiciary have also criticized the sentencing disparity.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has labeled the ratio misguided, in that it
targets crack dealers and sentences them more harshly than cocaine
distributors, who pose a greater threat to the spread of drugs. 2 11 Judge
Robert Sweet of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York also opposes the ratio, condemning it as "Jim Crow justice." 2 12 Judge
Paul Cassell, a George W. Bush appointee formerly in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah, has derided the sentencing disparity for
meting out unequal justice to crack cocaine defendants. 2 13 A general
consensus has emerged among members of the judiciary: in 1997, twentyseven federal judges signed a letter to the House Judiciary Committee
2 14
urging both the House and Senate to revisit and eradicate the ratio.
3. Legislators Call for Change
Congress has been criticized for failing to rectify the Act's sentencing
scheme almost since its enactment but did not take significant corrective
action until a special hearing on May 21, 2009.215 Major League Baseball
208. See Del Quentin Wilber, Two Judges Target Cocaine Penalties: Disparityfor Crack
Crimes Criticized,WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at B2.
209. See Gary Fields, White House Czar Callsfor End to 'War on Drugs': Kerlikowske
Says Analogy Is Counterproductive; Shift Aligns with Administration Preference for

Treatment over Incarceration,WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at A3.
210. See Cose, supra note 18.
211. See id.
212. See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 4.
213. See id.
214. See id. ("[I]t is our strongly held view that the current disparity between powder
cocaine and crack cocaine, in both mandatory minimum statutes and the guidelines, cannot
be justified and results in sentences that are unjust and do not serve society's interest.").
215. See Unfairness in Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is It Time To Crack the 100 to 1
Disparity?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
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star Willie Mays Aikens, who was just released from a twenty-year
sentence for crack cocaine distribution, bribery, and gun charges, was a
witness at the hearing. He testified that had he been arrested with powder
cocaine instead of crack cocaine he would have served no more than
twenty-seven months under the Act's sentencing structure. 2 16 Contrary to
suggestions from social justice groups and the Sentencing Commission,
Congress initially considered increasing powder cocaine sentences instead
of decreasing sentences for crack cocaine, concerned that eradicating jail
time would have the adverse effect of spurring resurgence in crack
2 17
dealing.
Heightened awareness among legislators about the current state of crack
cocaine sentencing has led to the introduction of a potentially monumental
amendment. Representative Maxine Waters introduced the "Major Drug
Traffickers Prosecution Act of 2009,"218 which would eliminate the onehundred-to-one ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine and attempt to
curb prosecution of low-level crack offenders. 2 19 The bill would also allow
judges discretion to determine whether probation rather than jail time is the
220
appropriate punishment.
Actions in the Senate have mirrored those taken by the House. Senator
Dick Durbin of Illinois has enlisted four other senators, one of whom voted
in favor of the Act in 1986,221 in cosponsoring the Fair Sentencing Act of
2009,222 which institutes a one-to-one ratio for crack and powder cocaine
sentencing. Under this new act, the amount of cocaine base needed to
trigger the five-year sentence would be increased to five hundred grams, or
the same quantity as powder cocaine. 223 Similarly, possession of five
thousand grams of crack cocaine or powder cocaine would trigger a tenyear sentence. 224 The bill would also direct federal resources to prevent
the H. Comm. on the Judiciaryon H.R. 1459, H.R. 1466, H.R. 265, H.R. 2718, and H.R. 18,
111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter House Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/printers/ 11 th/i 11-27_49783.PDF.
216. See Michael O'Keeffe, Aikens Pressing To Fix Coke Laws, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May
21, 2009, at 68.
217. See House Hearing, supra note 215 at 6.
218. See H.R. 1466, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
219. See id. § 4(b).
220. See id.
221. Five of twelve cosponsors of the bill, Senators Patrick Leahy of Vermont,
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, Carl Levin of Michigan, Thomas Harkin of Iowa, and
John Kerry of Massachusetts, voted in favor of the Act in 1986. Senators Russell Feingold
of Wisconsin, Benjamin Cardin of Maryland, Alan Franken of Minnesota, Bernard Sanders
of Vermont, Edward Kaufman of Delaware, Sherrod Brown of Ohio, and Roland Burris of
Illinois were not in office for the enactment of the Act, but are now sponsors of the Fair
Sentencing Act. Dick Durbin of Illinois, who also was not in office when the 1986 Act was
adopted, introduced the bill. See Carrie Johnson, Bill Targets Sentencing Rules for Crack
and Powder Cocaine, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2009, at A6; S. 1789: Fair Sentencing Act of
2009, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=slll-1789 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2010).
222. S. 1789, 111 th Cong. (2009).
223. See id. § 2(a)(2).
224. See id. § 2(a)(1).
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large-scale drug trafficking and increase the number 225
of aggravating factors
that can be considered as warranting a higher penalty.
Drug addiction in the United States has ebbed and flowed in the last
century, reaching its apex during the mid-1980s. 22 6 Attempts to regulate
cocaine gained traction in the early 1900s through "scare politics" advanced
by Southern Democrats. 22 7 Regulation efforts intensified in the 1950s, yet
the drug was never eradicated. 228 Rather, cocaine usage increased
consistently during the second half of the nineteenth century until in the
early 1980s, when crack cocaine was created and replaced other forms of
cocaine, primarily in inner cities. 229 At the time Congress began drafting
the Act, Americans understood the dangerous repercussions of cocaine
2 30
addiction, but knew relatively little about crack cocaine.
Congress's response to the emerging epidemic in 1986 seemed
proportional but was grounded in insufficient research and truncated floor
debates, similar to the process by which the Harrison Act was passed in
1914.231 Since the Act's passage, two decades of conflicting messages
from Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Supreme Court have
magnified the issues surrounding the interpretation of the Act and the
consequences of the one-hundred-to-one ratio. Part II discusses how courts
have grappled with issuing appropriate sentences in light of their concern
about propagating the widely criticized racial disparity.
II. "COCAINE BASE" CIRCUIT SPLIT DEEPENS, MAGNIFYING POLICY
CONCERNS OVER SENTENCING DISPARITY

In a struggle to harmonize disapproval of crack cocaine sentencing
schemes with meting out appropriate punishment, courts have explored
many avenues, scrutinizing the meaning of every term of the Act,
particularly the penalty section. In recent years, the circuit split regarding
the meaning of the term "cocaine base" in the sentencing scheme has only
deepened. 232 Some courts interpret the Act to refer to all forms of cocaine
base, while others look at the legislative intent to discern another definition.
Invariably, these decisions include policy discussions, as courts are
concerned about the racial disparity the sentencing scheme propagates.
More recently, many sentencing courts have usurped Congress's role and
instituted their own ratios of crack cocaine to powder cocaine.

225. See id. § 6.
226. See generally Kerr, supra note 50.
227. See supra Part I.A.1.

228. See supra Part I.A.1, B.1.
229. See supra Part I.A.
230. See supra Part I.C.

231. Seesupra Part I.A.1, C.1.
232. The Sixth Circuit recently decided a case that added to the circuit split. See United
States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2009).
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A. Courts' DivergingResponses to the Act's Language: Cocaine Base or
Crack Cocaine?
The U.S. courts of appeals exhibit substantial divergence regarding the
interpretation of the statutory sentences for drug related offenses. Some
have equated "cocaine base" with "crack cocaine." In those jurisdictions,
only defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses receive the heightened
penalty. 233 Other circuits have held that any form of cocaine base qualifies
for the heightened sentence, meaning that an individual convicted of
possessing five grams of the unusable form of cocaine base, smokeable
cocaine base, or crack cocaine would be subject to a prison term of five
years. 234 One circuit holds that any smokeable form of cocaine base,
including, but not limited to, crack cocaine, is subject to the harsher
sentence. 235
1. Only Crack Cocaine Receives Heightened Sentences
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits subject defendants found in possession of crack cocaine to harsh
punishments. Possession of all other forms of cocaine base, including
cocaine paste and freebase cocaine, along with powder cocaine and
236
untreated cocaine, are sentenced less severely.
a. Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. Munoz-Realpe,237 the Eleventh Circuit limited the
"cocaine base" substances that receive a heightened sentence to crack
cocaine. 238 The defendant was arrested for possession of six liquor bottles
containing a liquid that tested positive for cocaine base, but the substance
had not yet been converted into crack cocaine. 239 At sentencing, MunozRealpe argued that liquid cocaine base could not be used without further
240
processing and should not receive the harsher penalty.
Rather than follow its own precedent that cocaine base comprises more
than crack cocaine, 24 1 the Eleventh Circuit departed from this standard,
24 2
looking to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
233. See infra Part II.A.1.
234. See infra Part II.A.3.
235. See infra Part II.A.2.
236. See supra Part I.A.3.
237. 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994).
238. See id.
239. See id. at 376.
240. See id. During its conversion into crack cocaine, powder cocaine is mixed with
baking soda and heated into a liquid. The drug is not usable until it hardens into "rocks." See
supra Part I.A.3.
241. See Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1375
(1 th Cir. 1992)).
242. See id. at 376 (citing United States v. Vistoli-Ferroni, 783 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Fla.
1991)).
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which found that Congress did not intend for the severe penalties for crack
cocaine to be applied to any form of cocaine base other than crack
cocaine. 243 The Eleventh Circuit in Munoz-Realpe ultimately decreased the
defendant's sentence based on the premise that the substance he possessed
244
was to be treated as cocaine hydrochloride rather than cocaine base.
The Eleventh Circuit was further persuaded by the proposed amendment
from the Sentencing Commission in 1993245 that specified that cocaine base
meant crack cocaine. 24 6 The court found that Congress had given its tacit
approval of the definition of cocaine base as crack cocaine by taking no
action against the Sentencing Commission's amendment. 247 Thus, based on
legislative intent and precedent from other jurisdictions, the Munoz-Realpe
court set new Eleventh8 Circuit precedent that only crack cocaine merits a
24
heightened sentence.
b. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit considered the issue of whether cocaine base refers
249
to substances other than crack cocaine in United States v. Edwards.
Edwards was convicted of possessing more than fifty grams of cocaine base
that was not crack cocaine and was sentenced to the statutory minimum of
ten years.250 In reversing Edwards's sentence, 25 1 the court determined that
because cocaine base can be converted into powder cocaine and the process
is just as easily reversed, the substances are basically identical. 252 The
court declined to void the statute for vagueness, however, because
legislative intent was clear: "the overriding Congressional concern behind
the stiffer penalties for cocaine base was the alarming rise in the use of
crack. '25 3 The opinion ended with a plea to the Supreme Court or Congress
254
to resolve the circuit split.

243. See id. at 376 n.2.
244. See id. at 377-79.
245. See id. at 377. The amendment took effect November 1, 1993. See supra Part I.D.

246. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D.I(c)(D), at 144 (2002). This case
preceded the United States v. Booker decision; thus the Guidelines were still binding upon
sentencing courts.
247. See Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377-78. When the Sentencing Commission proposes
an amendment to the Guidelines, such amendment is submitted to Congress. If Congress
takes no action, the amendment takes effect in 180 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006).
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 378-79.
397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 572-73.
Seeid. at 577.
See id. at 574.

253. Id.
254. See id. at 577 ("A lingering and stratified circuit split on a matter of such importance
to the administration of criminal justice surely warrants the attention of Congress or
resolution by the Supreme Court.").
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c. Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Hollis, 255 the Ninth Circuit found that "cocaine base"
reasonably means crack cocaine. 256 Hollis was convicted of distributing
fifty grams of cocaine base and sentenced under the Act to twenty years2 in
57
prison, which was also based on the fact that he had a prior conviction.
the
On appeal, Hollis argued that because crack cocaine was not charged in258
indictment or found by a jury, the heightened sentence should not apply.
In its decision, the court entered into a chemical analysis of the forms of
cocaine base and concluded that because crack cocaine is the most
dangerous, Congress intended for harsher penalties to apply only to crack
cocaine. 259 Moreover, according to the .court, Congress was reacting to a
crack epidemic in the United States in 1986 and likely sought to target
crack cocaine offenders. 260 As a result, the court found that the government
must charge and the jury must find that the defendant distributed crack
cocaine; securing a conviction for mere cocaine base is insufficient to
261
warrant imposition of a heightened sentence.
d. Sixth Circuit
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit joined the conversation on the meaning of
cocaine base, deepening the circuit split.262 The court looked to expert
testimony equating cocaine base and crack cocaine, legislative intent, and
the Sentencing Guidelines to set new precedent that a defendant can only be
subject to the heightened sentence for crack cocaine. 263 The Sixth Circuit
was persuaded that the terms "crack cocaine" and "cocaine base" were used
interchangeably at trial. 264 Similarly, although the verdict form mentioned
only cocaine base, the judge clarified in the jury charge that cocaine base
means crack cocaine. 265 The court noted that this definition "create[s]
266
consistency between the Guidelines and the statute."
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits rely mostly on
legislative intent and the Sentencing Guidelines in drawing a bright line at
crack cocaine. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
attempted to honor both the plain language of "cocaine base" and legislative
intent by recalling the practice of "freebasing," which refers to smokeable
255. 490 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).
256. See id.
at 1156.
257. See id. at 1152 (noting that drug type and quantity, coupled with a defendant's prior
history, can increase the maximum sentence).
258. See id.
at 1155.
at 1156; see also supra tbl. 1.
259. See id.
260. See Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156.
261. See id

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 395-96.
See id. at 387.
See id,
Id. at 395.
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forms of cocaine. 267 The next section discusses this opinion, currently
embraced by only one circuit.
2. Cocaine Base Is Equivalent to Smokeable Forms of Cocaine
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit considered enhanced sentencing for cocaine
base offenses in United States v. Brisbane.2 68 Brisbane was convicted of
distributing five or more grams of cocaine base. 269 The circuit court
discussed the differences between powder cocaine and cocaine base,
specifically noting the ingestion methods: smoking and snorting. 270 The
court found that Congress perceived smokeable forms of cocaine to be the
most dangerous and imposed stricter sentences for those substances in the
1986 Act. 27 1 Thus, the court defined "cocaine base" as any form of cocaine
that is smokeable.
The D.C. Circuit requires the prosecution to demonstrate, through
chemical evidence, that the substance recovered from the defendant could
have been smoked. In Brisbane, the court found that the government failed
to prove that the substance distributed by Brisbane was smokeable. 272 The
D.C. Circuit vacated Brisbane's conviction for distributing cocaine base and
remanded the case for a judgment of conviction for distributing powder
273
cocaine and to sentence accordingly.
The D.C. Circuit stands alone in its contention that the term "cocaine
base" means smokeable forms of cocaine. The remainder of the circuits
that have considered the issue take the plain meaning approach to an
extreme, holding that cocaine base applies to a74 host of cocaine
2
compositions, including those forms that are unusable.
3. Cocaine Base Equals Crack Cocaine, Smokeable Cocaine, and Untreated
Cocaine Base
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Tenth Circuits subject defendants found in possession of crack cocaine,
cocaine paste, smokeable cocaine, and untreated cocaine to the heightened
267. See supra Part I.A.2-3, tbl.1.
268. 367 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
269. See id. at 910-11.
270. See id. at 911.
271. See id. at 912. In fact, during congressional debates, lawmakers apparently believed
that smokeable forms of cocaine were colloquially called crack. See 132 CONG. REC. 17,919
(1986) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("The greatest current attention is on the smokeable
freebase cocaine known as crack .... .").
Indeed, in designating October 1986 as
Crack/Cocaine Awareness Month, the Senate corroborated this perception. See id. at 20,559
(statement of Sen. Roth) ("[I]n a hearing last month, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations learned about the dangers of crack, the smokable form of cocaine."); see also
supra Part I.C; infra Part III.

272. See Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 914; see also supra tbl. 1.
273. See Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 915.
274. The Eighth Circuit is the only court of appeals that has not considered the meaning
of "cocaine base." See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 395 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009).
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punishments described above. 2 75 These circuits follow the plain meaning
of the statute, holding that because cocaine base actually encompasses more
than just crack cocaine, any drug that takes the chemical form of cocaine
base should be punished as such.
a. Second Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the plain
meaning of the text of the statute in United States v. Jackson.27 6 Jackson
pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute three hundred grams of
cocaine base.2 77 At sentencing, he argued that because cocaine base is not
278
properly defined in the statute, the statute fails as impermissibly vague.
The district court agreed, noting that courts of appeals have failed to agree
2 79
about the meaning of cocaine base.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of a lesser
sentence, declining to use the circuit split as grounds for finding the statute
void for vagueness. 280 The court reasoned that because cocaine base can be
scientifically differentiated from powder cocaine, sentencing courts have
sufficient information from which they determine an appropriate
28 1
sentence.
In United States v. Fields,282 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Jackson,
upholding enhanced sentencing for possession of cocaine base. 2 83 The
district court had asserted that the rule of lenity requires a sentencing court
to select the lesser penalty when faced with ambiguity in a statute. 2 84 The
court reasoned that while it is clear that Congress likely meant for the
higher penalties to apply to crack cocaine, given the language of the Act,
the court was entitled to determine that cocaine base encompassed more
than the term crack cocaine. 285
b. Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Easter,2 86 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit considered whether the language of the Act provided insufficient
guidance to lower courts. 2 87 A jury convicted Easter of conspiracy to
275.
tbl. 1.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

For more information on the chemical properties and forms of cocaine, see supra
968 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 163-64.
See id. at 163.
113 F.3d 313 (2dCir. 1997).
See id.
See id. at 325.

285. Id.
286. 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992).
287. See id.

2010]

REFORMING COCAINE SENTENCING POLICY

2563

possess and distribute cocaine base, and he was subject to the heightened
penalty. 288 On appeal, Easter argued that the Act leads to arbitrary
enforcement of the enhanced penalties because courts are not given clear
direction as to whether a substance is cocaine base. 28 9 In response, the
Tenth Circuit considered the plain language of the statute and held that
cocaine base is sufficiently defined and clearly encompasses more than
crack cocaine. 290 In its analysis, the court found it persuasive that Easter
to refute the chemist's conclusion
did not present any evidence or testimony
291
that Easter possessed cocaine base.
c. Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Butler,292 the Fifth Circuit ruled that a defendant
could be subject to a heightened sentence for possession of cocaine base,
even though it was in an unusable form upon confiscation. 293 Butler
attempted to convince the court that because the government did not
produce any evidence that the substance he possessed was smokeable, it
was not cocaine base within the meaning of the statute. 294 The court
rejected this contention, noting that although crack cocaine and cocaine
courts are entitled to sentence all
base are commonly used interchangeably,
295
forms of cocaine base stringently.
d. Third Circuit
In 2001, the Third Circuit attempted to harmonize the Sentencing
Commission's stated definition of cocaine base with the plain language of
the statute, reaching a contrary conclusion 296 to what the Eleventh Circuit
The defendant swallowed cocaine base for smuggling,
adopted. 297
believing it to be heroin. 298 This mistake of fact notwithstanding, the
defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than
fifty grams of cocaine base. 299 On appeal, the defendant cited the
Sentencing Commission's 1993 amendment defining cocaine base as crack
cocaine to argue that he was unfairly subjected to a more stringent
sentence. 300 The court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

See id. at 1552.
Id. at 1557-58.
Id. at 1558.
Id.
988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 542-43.
Id.

295. Id.; see infra Part II.A.3.v.

296. See United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001).
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra Part I.A. 1.i.
Barbosa,271 F.3d at 448.
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 449.
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Sentencing Commission's amendment "could not override" the words of
30 1
the statute.
e. First Circuit
In United States v. Medina,302 the First Circuit held that the harsher
sentence applies to possession of any form of cocaine base. 303 Medina was
convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, heroin, and
marijuana and received the heightened sentence. 30 4 On appeal, Medina
argued that the jury instructions were deficient because they did not ask the
jury to determine whether the substance was crack cocaine; rather, the trial
judge instructed the jury that the government must prove, inter alia, "that
the controlled substance involved here was cocaine base." 305 The First
Circuit held that the possession of any form of cocaine base, including
crack cocaine, is among the substances that merit the higher sentence. 30 6
f. Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Ramos, 307 the Fourth Circuit joined the group of
circuits that adhere to the plain-meaning rule in defining cocaine base. 30 8
The defendant was found guilty of distributing crack cocaine and subjected
to the heightened sentence. 309 On appeal, Ramos argued that the trial judge
erred by failing to instruct the jury that it was required to make a specific
finding that the substance was crack cocaine rather than cocaine base. 310 In
rejecting Ramos's argument, the court stated that a judge may rely on
nothing more than the statutory text in issuing jury instructions. 31 1 The
court found that the statutory language allows courts to sentence all forms
3 12
of cocaine base equally.
In deciding the meaning of "cocaine base," nearly every circuit court has
grappled with issues of legislative intent and chemical composition.
Another central aspect of a court's inquiry into the meaning of cocaine base
is a policy discussion about the disparity caused by the Act's one-hundredto-one ratio. Courts have signaled concern that their decisions may
exacerbate disproportionate sentences. Without Supreme Court precedent

301. Id. at 463 (recognizing that Congress enacted the sentencing scheme to respond to
the crack cocaine epidemic, but that "Congress has not seen fit to adopt any definition or
similar delineation of 'cocaine base,' contrary or otherwise").
302. 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005).
303. See id. at 92.
304. See id. at 90, 92-93.
305. Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
306. Id.
307. 462 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2006).
308. Id. at 333-34.
309. Id. at 331, 333.
310. Id. at 333-34.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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resolving this split, courts have looked to other decisions, including
Kimbrough v. United States3 13 and Spears v. United States,3 14 to rationalize

the imposition of different ratios.
B. Courts Institute Their Own Ratios

When the Supreme Court granted sentencing courts the option to replace
the statutory one-hundred-to-one ratio with their own judicially created
penalty schemes in Spears,3 15 many lower courts changed their approach to
sentencing cocaine offenses almost immediately.
Under Spears, a
sentencing judge who disagrees with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines
range may depart from that range based purely on policy concerns, rather
3 16
than traditional mitigating factors set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines.
In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
relied on Spears and Kimbrough to institute a one-to-one ratio of crack
cocaine to powder cocaine. 317 Citing remarks made by Attorney General
Eric Holder 318 and a recent study by the Sentencing Commission, 319 the
court declared that current shifts in public policy rendered the one-hundredto-one ratio "a 'remarkably blunt instrument,"' especially where crack
cocaine has not been proven quantitatively more dangerous than powder
cocaine. 320 The Western District of Pennsylvania followed its decision
with a memorandum mandating that all future cocaine sentencings follow
this one-to-one ratio. 321 The U.S. District Courts for the Western District of
Virginia and the District of Columbia have also adopted a one-to-one
ratio, 32 2 based upon policy disagreements with the Act's one-hundred-to323
one ratio, as well as the racial disparity caused by the Act.
Following the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa's
example, 324 which was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Spears,32 5 the
313. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
314. 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam).
315. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
316. See Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 842. Traditional mitigating factors that courts may
consider when meting out a sentence include the nature of the offense; the defendant's
criminal history; the possibility of rehabilitation; the need for incapacitation and retribution;
and the possibility of deterrence. See Levy, supra note 171, at 2631.
317. See United States v. Russell, No. 06-72 Erie, 2009 WL 2485734, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
Aug. 12, 2009) ("I have concluded that there are sound policy reasons for adopting a 1-to-1
crack to powder ratio for all crack cocaine sentencings.").
318. See id. at*1.
319. See id. at *2.
320. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (N.D. Iowa
2009)).
321. See United States v. Knight, No. 98-03 Erie, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91556, at *3--4
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009) (noting that the ratio should not be applied retroactively, absent a
statutory change).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Luck, No. 3:04-CR-00047-006, 2009 WL 2462192 (W.D.
Va. Aug. 10, 2009); United States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2009).
323. See Luck, 2009 WL 2462192, at *2; Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
324. See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
325. See Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 842 (2009) (per curiam); supra Part I.E.
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Southern District of New York instated a twenty-to-one ratio of powder
cocaine to crack cocaine. 326 Taking issue with the racial disparity caused
by the Act, the Southern District of New York relied on Kimbrough and
Spears to institute its own ratio. 32 7 Instead of following the Sentencing
Guidelines, the court considered the defendant's youth and the fact that he
was enrolled in school in sentencing the defendant to the statutory
minimum. 32 8 District courts in Rhode Island and Wisconsin have also
adopted a twenty-to-one ratio based upon policy considerations. 32 9 These
courts deride the one-hundred-to-one ratio as illogical, but assert that
possession of crack cocaine is a more serious offense than having powder
cocaine, rendering the twenty-to-one ratio proportionate. 330
Having explored the deepening circuit split caused by the ambiguous
wording in the Act and the newly emerging phenomenon of court-created
ratios, it is evident that a judicial remedy to the racial disparity will not
achieve consistent federal sentencing policy. Left to their own devices in
determining what punishment is appropriate, some courts have expanded
the kind of cocaine base needed to trigger a heightened sentence, while
other courts have determined that Kimbrough permits them to institute their
own ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine. 331 Circuit courts have
continually asked for guidance from the Supreme Court and the
legislature, 332 but their pleas have gone unanswered. 33 3 Part III of this Note
argues that divergent approaches across jurisdictions warrant a joint effort
by both Congress and the courts to eliminate the disparity.
III. ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY THROUGH A LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL SOLUTION

Part II of this Note detailed the circuit split regarding the meaning of
"cocaine base" and the new trend of judicially created ratios of crack
cocaine to powder cocaine, both of which severely impede the creation of a
consistent federal drug policy. The sentence for possession of cocaine base
326. See United States v. Dozier, No. S1 08 Cr. 08-02(RWS), 2009 WL 1286486
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009); see also United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 304, 307
(D.R.I. 2005) (instituting a twenty-to-one ratio, and noting that "when a Guideline sentence
involves a nearly impossible-to-justify disparity such as this [ratio], the sentence neither
accurately reflects the seriousness of the offense, nor promotes general respect for the
criminal justice system").
327. See Dozier, 2009 WL 1286486, at *3, *6 ("Use of this 20:1 in the present case will
mitigate the disparity between this sentence and one imposed on a defendant who engaged in
substantially similar conduct that involved powder cocaine.
328. See id. at *7.

329. See, e.g., Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 307-08; United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d
771, 781-82 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
330. See id.

331. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A lingering

and stratified circuit split on a matter of such importance to the administration of criminal
justice surely warrants the attention of Congress or resolution by the Supreme Court.").
333. See supra Part I.E.
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in one circuit court may be vastly different from that of a neighboring
circuit. 334 Moreover, the Kimbrough decision has prompted lower courts to

derive their own sentencing ratios from policy considerations, further
exacerbating sentencing disparities. 335 Resolution of these issues requires
action by both Congress and the judiciary. This part begins with an
exploration of the legislative history of the Act, proposing that Congress
intended to target crack cocaine, not all forms of cocaine base. It then
addresses the failure of the judicially created remedies to mitigate the Act's
racial disparity properly. This Note concludes by evaluating the 1986 Act
and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2009, advocating for collaboration between
the legislature and judiciary to eradicate the racial disparity the onehundred-to-one ratio has caused.
A. Legislative Intent Is Unambiguous: Cocaine Base Means
Crack Cocaine
336
Although the legislative history of the Act is somewhat abridged,
Congress was deliberate in targeting crack cocaine. Statements made by
legislators and President Reagan prior to the Act's passage, along with
subsequent reports from the media and the Sentencing Commission,
indicate that the drafters intended to impose a higher sentence for crimes
involving crack cocaine only, and not any other form of cocaine base. 337 A
majority of floor discussions and media statements by Senators and
338
Representatives centered around dangers specific to crack cocaine.
Similarly, the surge in President Reagan's War on Drugs paralleled the
emergence of the crack cocaine epidemic. 3 39 Finally, both the media and
the Act to create harsher sentences
the Sentencing Commission understood
340
specifically for crack cocaine.
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that Congress's objective
was to combat the crack cocaine epidemic and distinguish crack cocaine
from all other forms of cocaine. During congressional debates prior to the
Act's adoption, speakers did not use the term "cocaine base." 34 1 In fact, the
drafters relegated crack cocaine to its own unique category, apart from other
forms of cocaine. 342 During a speech expressing his support of harsher
sentences for crack cocaine dealers, Senator Chiles, an especially vocal
supporter3 of the Act, explicitly recognized "crack as a distinct and separate
34
drug."

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See supra Part I.E.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C. 1.
See supra Part I.C-D.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B, D.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See 132 CONG. REc. 27,190 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles); supra Part I.C.
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The Act's sentencing scheme was meant to reflect Congress's perception
of crack cocaine as the most dangerous form of cocaine. 344 In justifying the
imposition of a statutory minimum for possession of five grams of cocaine
base, legislators pointed to the imminent threat of crack cocaine without
mentioning risks inherent in other forms of cocaine. 345 Congress focused
almost exclusively on the addictive quality and low cost of crack cocaine,
and it is unlikely that Congress believed other forms of cocaine base
346
warranted such stringent sentences.
Executive policy was similarly unequivocal: Reagan's War on Drugs
targeted crack cocaine. 347 Efforts by the Reagan Administration to combat
drug abuse also recognized that crack cocaine posed a special threat to
public health. 348 Crack cocaine was the centerpiece of the War on Drugs,
as demonstrated through presidential addresses and public service
announcements. 34 9 Concurrent with the passage of the Act, Reagan hailed
a "'national crusade against drugs,"' promising fervent efforts to eradicate
350
lethal drugs, especially crack cocaine.
Third-party interpretation also demonstrates that cocaine base was
intended to mean crack cocaine, as the media and Sentencing Commission
perceived the Act as targeting crack cocaine. Media coverage, which was a
major impetus for the Act, 35 1 sensationalized a crack cocaine epidemic, not
a cocaine base epidemic. 3 52 News reports consistently linked high-profile
drug overdoses to crack cocaine. A series of front page stories in major
newspapers attributed the death of Len Bias to crack cocaine, prompting
nationwide panic about the new drug. 353 In fact, the media frenzy was
based on unfounded rumors; three years after Bias's death, it was revealed
that the cause of Bias's death was powder cocaine. 3 54 From investigative
television programs to The New York Times, a deluge of media reports,
devoted solely to crack cocaine, ensued. 355 Subsequent to the Act's
344. See supra Part I.C.
345. See supra Part I.C.

346. See supra Part I.A.3, tbl.1.
347. See supra Part I.A.3.
348. See Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse, supra note 116
("Today there's a new epidemic: smokeable cocaine, otherwise known as crack. It is an
explosively destructive and often lethal substance which is crushing its users. It is an
uncontrolled fire.").
349. See supra Part I.B.2.
350. See Bernard Weinraub, The Matter of Money and FightingDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1987, at B6 (reporting President Reagan's statement at the signing ceremony: "'The
American people want their government to get tough and to go on the offensive and that's
what we intend with more ferocity than ever before."').
351. See supra Part I.A.2, C.
352. See supra Part I.A.2.
353. See supra Part I.A.2. Three years after Bias's death, the misperception was
corrected, and it was revealed that the cause of Bias's death was powder cocaine. See
Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, supra note 70.

354. See Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, supra note 70.
355. For a discussion of media coverage at the time of the Act's passage, see supra notes
67-73 and accompanying text.
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passage, the media still did not use the term "cocaine base," but only
recognized that stricter sentences had been implemented for crack
356
cocaine.
The Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the Act, released in 1993,
followed by Congress's tacit approval of this interpretation, also sheds light
on the intended meaning of "cocaine base." 357 Seven years after the 1986
Act was passed, the Sentencing Commission submitted an amendment to its
Guidelines, defining "cocaine base" as crack cocaine. 358 Congress did not
vote on the 1993 amendment; thus, for the purposes of the Sentencing
Guidelines, cocaine base referred to crack cocaine, rather than other
untreated forms of cocaine. 35 9 By 1993, if lower courts harbored any
reservations that the Act's sentence for cocaine base referred to crack
cocaine, Congress's failure to disapprove of the Sentencing Commission's
definition should have resolved any concerns.
The prevailing argument proffered by those who continue to find
ambiguity in the Act is that if Congress had meant to target only crack
360
cocaine, its drafters would not have used the term "cocaine base."
However, this contention fails to recognize the atmosphere at the time of
the Act. In 1986, Congress's knowledge of the many forms of cocaine was
cursory and lawmakers likely did not know that other forms of cocaine base
even existed. 361 Washington D.C. prosecutors called upon "experts" such
as Johnny St. Valentine Brown 362 for the same reason Congress did: both
jurors and members of Congress were not well versed in the narcotics
363
lexicon.
Statements by members of Congress, President Reagan, the media, and
the Sentencing Commission demonstrate that the legislature did not intend
to create ambiguity regarding the meaning of cocaine base. The penalty
scheme set forth in the Act mandated a one-hundred-to-one ratio of powder
cocaine to crack cocaine. The circuit split persists, however, as some courts
are unable to ignore the racial disparity the one-hundred-to-one ratio has
364
created.
B. Legislative Inaction Begets UnsatisfactoryJudicialRemedies
Despite the predominant public perception that crack cocaine sentencing
policies were unfair, Congress remained silent for over two decades,
leaving courts to note the irrational disparity the Act has created. From
356. See Kerr, supra note 50, at 36.
357. See supra Part I.D.
358. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 174, § 2D1.1(c)(D), at 144.

359. See supra Part I.D. When the Sentencing Commission proposes an amendment to
the Guidelines, the amendment is submitted to Congress; if Congress takes no action, the
amendment takes effect in 180 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
360. See supra Part II.A.3.
361. See supra Part I.B.
362. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part I.B.1, C.1.
364. See supra Part II.
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sentencing courts to the Supreme Court, judges have attempted to find
solutions to the Act's ambiguity and racial disparity but managed only to
confuse federal sentencing policy further.
Rather than resolving a pressing circuit split as to the meaning of the Act,
the Supreme Court in Kimbrough and Spears shifted the burden to lower
courts, permitting judges to weigh public policy over statutory guidelines in
determining what sentencing scheme is appropriate. Some judges have
responded by creating their own ratios, which range from one-hundred-to365
one to one-to-one.
Despite incontrovertible evidence of legislative intent, the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have expanded the meaning of
"cocaine base" to encompass more than crack cocaine, including coca paste
and cocaine freebase. 366 These courts have likely reached this position in
an attempt to mitigate the racial disparity that has resulted from the onehundred-to-one ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine. 367 Because
crimes involving all forms of cocaine base are not committed
all forms of
disproportionately by African American defendants, punishing
368
cocaine base equally diminishes the discriminatory effect.
As appellate courts continue to issue divergent opinions about the
meaning of "cocaine base," sentencing courts further confuse the circuit
369
split by imposing their own ratios of powder cocaine to crack cocaine.
These dueling judicial efforts inhibit uniformity in federal drug sentencing.
Although judicial remedies such as modifying the Act's meaning and
creating lower ratios increase haphazardness in sentencing, the
alternative-following the language of the Act and sentencing crack
cocaine users one hundred times more severely-is also unsatisfactory
because the Act itself is flawed.
C. Justificationsfor the Act Do Not Warranta One-Hundred-to-OneRatio
of Powder Cocaine to Crack Cocaine
Upon adopting the 1986 Act, Congress justified sentencing crack cocaine
offenders more severely because it was more addictive, linked with violent
crime, prevalent among youth, inexpensive, and posed prenatal threats to
children. 370 In light of research conducted over the past twenty years, these
concerns do not merit the one-hundred-to-one ratio.

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part I.B.
See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 6.
See supra Part lI.B.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

2010]

REFORMING COCAINE SENTENCING POLICY

2571

1. Crack Cocaine Is Not More Addictive than Powder Cocaine
Crack cocaine is not unilaterally more addictive than powder cocaine
simply because it enters the bloodstream faster.37 1 Ingestion method is only
one element in determining one's propensity for dependence; because all
drugs have the potential to be extremely addictive, psychological factors
and frequency of use must be considered before finding that one drug is
more addictive than another. 372 If a powder cocaine user has a
psychological predisposition to addiction, he is more likely to become
addicted to powder cocaine than a crack cocaine user without such a
predisposition.
2. Association of Violent Crime and Crack Cocaine Is Misguided
Violent crime is not confined to the distribution of crack cocaine, but
rather to dealing high volumes of any street drug. As early as 1988, of 414
homicides committed in New York City, only three were definitively
related to crack cocaine. 373 Currently, over seventy-five percent of crack
cocaine users are not involved in gun-related crime. 374 While "turf-wars"
and crime among drug dealers are tragic byproducts of the prevalence of
drugs in inner cities, if there were no crack cocaine, it is not likely that such
violence would significantly decrease. 375
3. Crack Cocaine Use Among Pregnant Women Does Not Warrant a OneHundred-to-One Ratio for All Offenders
While the prenatal dangers of crack cocaine use may have justified the
Act's devotion of money for drug prevention, treatment, and education, this
consideration should not have dictated the sentencing scheme. Grounding a
disproportionate ratio in the effect of the drug on pregnant women does not
comport with the demographic most often arrested for the use and
distribution of crack cocaine. Ninety percent of the prison population
currently serving enhanced sentences for crack-cocaine-related crimes is
male. 376 Thus, attempting to deter crack cocaine abuse among a small
subset of users-pregnant women-does not warrant the institution of such
a draconian ratio.

371. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 160, at 18-19; supra Part I.A.3, tbl. 1.
372. See Vagins & McCurdy, supra note 129, at 5. Scientific reports have demonstrated
that all forms of cocaine are potent stimulants of the central nervous system and therefore
"powder and crack [cocaine] produce the same physiological and psychotropic effects on the
human brain." Id.
373. See id.
374. See id.

375. See id.
376. See 2002

REPORT,

supra note 160, at 63 tbl.3.
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4. Statistics About Crack Cocaine Use Among Youth Do Not Suggest the
Need for a Ratio
The notion that young people are prone to abuse crack cocaine more than
any other form of cocaine is not grounded in statistics, even at the time the
Act was adopted. In 1988, the rate of powder cocaine usage among
eighteen to twenty-five year olds was seven times higher than that of crack
cocaine. 377 According to the Sentencing Commission, eighteen to twentyfive year olds do not abuse the drug more than any other age group. 378
Congress's concern for young people at the time of the Act's inception was
likely caused by media coverage that overstated minors' involvement in
379
drug trafficking.
5. The Cost of Crack Cocaine Does Not Suggest a Need for
Heightened Sentences
Regulating a drug based on its cost is a patently misguided approach.
Were Congress to regulate all drugs based on price, drug laws would be
eminently disproportionate. In 1990, five hundred grams of powder
cocaine had a street value of approximately $50,000, while five grams of
crack cocaine was worth about $750.380 Under the Act, a defendant
convicted of trafficking $50,000 in powder cocaine would receive the same
sentence as a defendant guilty of dealing only $750 in crack cocaine. 38 1
Instead of targeting low-level crack cocaine dealers, a sentencing scheme
involving an assessment of both cost and quantity would appropriately
target criminals trafficking high volumes of drugs.
Even though the Act's stated justifications are plainly invalid, the racial
disparity continues, and the Act's ratio is still in effect. Lower courts have
implored the Supreme Court to resolve the split, but the burden should be
placed on Congress to determine not only the meaning of "cocaine base,"
but also whether the one-hundred-to-one ratio is appropriate.
D. The FairSentencingAct
The hasty drafting of the 1986 Act triggered a disturbing racial disparity
that has persisted for two decades. 382 Although Vice President Biden, who
was a senator and ardent supporter of the Act in 1986, has insisted that
Congress did not have discriminatory intent in creating the Act, he
concedes that the drafters did not have a grasp of crack cocaine or its
383
chemical properties.
377.
378.
cocaine
379.
380.
381.

See id. at 96.
See id. ("[T]he National Household Survey on Drug Abuse reports that crack
use among 18- to 25-year old adults historically has been low.").
See supra Part I.A.2.
See 2002 REPORT, supra note 160, at 112.
See id. at iv, 4.

382. See supra Parts I.C.2, I.D, II.

383. See Cose, supra note 18, at 25.
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Congress, the Supreme Court, and lower courts have magnified the
problems associated with the Act's sentencing disparity. During the 1980s,
Congress allowed intense media coverage of crack cocaine, similar to the
atmosphere created during the adoption of the Harrison Act in 1914,384 to
influence the Act's one-hundred-to-one ratio. 385 The Supreme Court had
the opportunity to resolve the circuit split in Kimbrough, but instead
386
prompted sentencing courts to create their own sentencing policy.
Appellate courts continue to express opposition to the one-hundred-to-one
387
ratio by adding ambiguity to the statutory meaning of cocaine base.
Lower courts have relied on Kimbrough to voice disagreement with the
388
Act's sentencing scheme.
With the Obama Administration came renewed efforts to change crack
cocaine sentencing policy. Congressional hearings put a spotlight on the
practical implications of the one-hundred-to-one ratio, finally provoking a
response. After permitting the sentencing disparity to plague narcotics
policy for over twenty years, Congress has taken steps towards eradicating
the one-hundred-to-one ratio with the introduction of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2009.389 Because the justifications for the ratio set forth in the 1986
Act are no longer persuasive, eliminating the ratio is an appropriate first
step in addressing the unfair sentencing disparity.
The adoption of the Fair Sentencing Act alone will not resolve the
unfairness in crack cocaine policy; the judiciary must also contribute to
correcting two decades of disproportionate narcotics sentencing. Judges
should refrain from imposing their own ratios and heed the legislative intent
of the Fair Sentencing Act: to ensure that sentencing schemes include
390
harsher punishments for high-volume drug traffickers and recidivists.
Courts should make sentencing decisions on a case-by-case basis,
considering the totality of the circumstances. Subsequent to Kimbrough,
judges have become preoccupied by policy concerns, allowing their
opinions on the 1986 Act to dictate their sentencing decisions. This result
not only subverts the individual analysis defendants deserve, but also fails
to achieve a coherent federal sentencing policy.
While the Fair Sentencing Act will not be retroactive and thus will not
change the sentences for offenders who were victims of the unsubstantiated
ratio, it is significant that Congress has recognized the need to repeal the
ratio. If the Fair Sentencing Act is passed, courts must contribute to the
transformation of federal drug sentencing by adhering to the letter of the
law. Although courts are still entitled to consider policy goals in issuing
sentences under Kimbrough and Spears, judges should refrain from
384. See supra Part I.A.
385. See supra Part I.B, C.

386. See supra Part I.E.
387. See supra Part II.A.
388. See supra Part II.B.

389. See supra Part I.F.3.
390. See supra Part I.F.3.
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CONCLUSION

The rise and fall of Bobby St. Valentine Brown is indicative of
congressional action in response to the growing drug problem in the United
States: initially triumphant but ultimately discredited. 39 1 Media coverage
and social stigmas in 1986 provoked Congress to act quickly and draft
legislation that disproportionately targeted crack cocaine. 392 Fueled by
uncorroborated testimony and intense press reports, Congress attempted to
target various drugs proportionately to the danger they posed.
Although the decision was misguided, Congress meant for the harsher
penalty to apply to crack cocaine offenses only.393 With an incomplete
understanding of crack cocaine, the legislature used the term "cocaine base"
in § 841(b), causing ambiguity that has beleaguered sentencing courts for
over two decades. Countless appeals based upon semantics and chemical
394
analyses have clogged the judicial system.
The dangers of crack cocaine are not one hundred times worse than those
of powder cocaine or any other form of cocaine, rendering the sentencing
scheme unsound. 395 Instead of accurately targeting dangerous, highvolume drug dealers, the 1986 Act has promulgated a troubling racial
disparity, with African Americans sentenced to jail more frequently than
Caucasians.396
Judges have altered their interpretations of the Act in an effort to
counteract the racial disparity. 397 The Kimbrough decision then validated a
judicial movement embraced by sentencing courts, which now take the
negative policy implications of the one-hundred-to-one ratio into account
before meting out punishment. 398 In Kimbrough and Spears, the Court
sanctioned lower courts' sua sponte imposition of their own ratios. 39 9 Such
an unsettling court-imposed remedy merely hampers justice by propagating
inconsistent sentencing across jurisdictions.
Legislative inaction in remedying the Act's ambiguity and the judiciary's
overactive discourse on the Act's penalty scheme sends a clear message to
cocaine dealers: possess and distribute in those areas where the courts
either interpret "cocaine base" narrowly or are politically opposed to the
statutory sentencing scheme. As courts' discretion in sentencing narcotics

391. See supra Introduction.

392. See supra Part 1.B--C.
393. See supra Part III.A.
394. See supra Part II.
395. See supra Part III.B.

396. See supra Part I.C.2.
397. See supra Part II.B.
398. See supra Part I.E.
399. See supra Part II.B.
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defendants broadens, more judges will likely institute their own ratios of
powder cocaine to crack cocaine.
Consistent federal drug sentencing policy has been as elusive as a victory
in the War on Drugs. The United States' addiction to illegal narcotics has
plagued the country for decades as efforts to curb drug abuse continually
fail. Enacting the Fair Sentencing Act is a long-overdue and necessary step
in overhauling a flawed drug policy. Sentencing courts must contribute to
the streamlining of federal drug policy by adhering to statutory guidelines
rather than imposing their own ratios. A joint effort by courts and Congress
to change the approach to cocaine regulation and sentencing will help
ensure consistent legislation and jurisprudence, thereby strengthening,
rather than hindering, enforcement of drug laws.
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